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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE
DURING A WAR ON TERRORISM, IRAQ OR NORTH KOREA?

CHRISTOPHER J. SCHMIDT*

I. INTRODUCTION
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the
United States-led coalition of nations commenced a “War on Terrorism.” Part
of the effort to defeat terrorism included swift and potentially longstanding
threats to civil liberties cast in the ideal of providing national security.1 Many
ordinary law-abiding citizens hesitate before questioning these measures,
particularly in light of the measures’ promise of national security.
About a year and a half into the War on Terrorism, the United States and a
minor contingent of supporting nations commenced a war against Iraq in order
to disarm Iraq’s alleged prohibited weapons of mass destruction and perhaps
also to liberate the Iraqi people from a tyrannical regime. Regardless of the
wavering reasoning behind the war, combat began on March 19, 2003, and
President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations on
May 1, 2003.2 The United States continues to occupy Iraq, and its troops have
been subjected to consistent guerrilla warfare attacks since May 1, 2003, with
more soldiers dying after the end of major combat operations than during
major combat.3
Increasing threats and mounting tension between the United States and
North Korea have existed for months concerning North Korea’s alleged
nuclear weapons program.4 A 1994 agreement between the United States and
* B.A., University of Maryland, 1998; J.D., Widener University School of Law, 2001. Member
of the Pennsylvania Bar. Many thanks to John Culhane, Steve Friedman, and Micah Yarbrough
for their support, encouragement, and assistance. Readers can contact the author at
cjs00009@hotmail.com.
1. For an overview of the all the measures used to confront terrorism, see University of
Michigan, America’s War Against Terrorism, at http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/
usterror.html#freedom (last updated Oct. 2, 2003).
2. See CNN.com, War Tracker: Latest Briefing, at http//:www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/
iraq/war.tracker/05.01.index.html (May 1, 2003) [hereinafter Special Report].
3. CNN.com, U.S. Deaths in Iraq Surpass ‘End of Major Combat’ Total, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/26/sprj.irq.intl.main/index.html (Aug. 26, 2003).
4. CNN.com, U.S. Rules Out One-on-One Talks, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/
asiapcf/east/08/27/nkorea.talks/index.html (Aug. 28, 2003).
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North Korea, meant to curb North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, has
unraveled.5 North Korea recently reactivated its nuclear weapons program,
sparking international concern.6 North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and might drop its self-imposed ban on ballistic missile
tests.7 After North Korea expelled international inspectors on December 31,
2002,8 it informed the Bush Administration that it had enough plutonium to
create six nuclear bombs.9 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also
believes North Korea might have already produced two nuclear weapons in the
early 1990s.10 In light of these circumstances, the Pentagon might consider
military options11 if diplomatic efforts, such as talks between the United States,
North Korea and four other nations, cannot resolve the crisis.12
Suppose that in the course of these three situations13 the United States
suspected that terrorist or military attacks would be launched from terrorist
organizations, Iraq, or North Korea.
Because the United States is
geographically protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and has relatively
friendly and secure neighboring countries, the likelihood of a traditional air,
sea or ground attack from terrorists, Iraq or North Korea is unlikely. Instead, a
potential biological, chemical or nuclear attack seems more likely. Similar to
the attack by the relatively small group of September 11 terrorists, a few
5. Bill Nichols, Report: N. Korea Suspected of Having 2nd Nuclear Plant, USA TODAY,
July 21, 2003, at 5A.
6. CNN.com, North Korea: Nuclear Tension, at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/
nkorea (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
7. See CNN.com, Timeline: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development, at
http://www.cnn.com/ 2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/20/nkorea.timeline.nuclear/ (Aug. 20, 2003).
8. David E. Sanger, North Korea Says: It Has Made Fuel for Atom Bombs, NEW YORK
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at 1.
9. Id. See also Nichols, supra note 5.
10. Sanger, supra note 8. See also Nichols, supra note 5.
11. Sanger, supra note 8.
12. Thomas Omestad, The Art of the Deal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 1, 2003, at
21, 22.
13. The United States deployed approximately two hundred troops to Liberia on August 14,
2003. Jeff Koinange, The Marines Have Landed, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/
08/14/otsc.koinange/index.html (Aug. 14, 2003). That deployment, which Congress did not
authorize, sent troops to act in a peacekeeping capacity to stabilize the country embroiled in
internal fighting. Id. By August 24, 2003, this force of Marines had left Liberia to return to ships
sailing near the coast. CNN.com, 150 Marines Leave Liberia, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/africa/08/24/liberia.marines/index.html (Aug. 24, 2003). The troops were not sent to
engage in a limited or formal war against an enemy or a prospective enemy, and they remained
there for only ten days; therefore, that deployment is not a subject of this article. For a discussion
of the presidential power to deploy troops abroad, see Robert F. Turner, Separation of Powers in
Foreign Policy: The Theoretical Underpinnings, 11 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 97, 114 (1988) (noting
that “short of declaring or launching a war against another state, the president has complete
discretion to deploy whatever Army the Congress makes available as he deems necessary to
protect the security of the [United States]”).
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individuals could conduct such a catastrophic attack. Those individuals, like
the September 11 terrorists, could already be residing and working within an
American community.
If the United States had information about those individuals, an effective
way to investigate them would be to watch them constantly. In fact, dozens of
“Islamic extremists” were under Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
surveillance in 2003, and the FBI was also “closely monitoring known
members of other terrorist organizations.”14 A logical way to perform such
surveillance would be to quarter CIA and FBI agents in homes within the
community in which the suspected terrorists or enemy soldiers reside. The
United States could then observe the suspects non-stop, from as close a
vantage point as possible.
Alternatively, what if CIA and FBI agents’ personal residences, offices and
other government buildings were subjected to terrorist or military threats,
leaving agents with no place to live or work? At that point, could CIA or FBI
agents be quartered in your house? While this measure, as well as the
quartering scenario described above, could be successful, it would also appear
to affect one of the treasured, albeit rarely invoked constitutional rights of
citizens.
This right is the Third Amendment’s prohibition against
nonconsensual quartering of soldiers in a person’s house during peacetime or
wartime (although nonconsensual quartering can occur during wartime through
a manner prescribed by law).15
Part II of this article examines the text of the Third Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Third Amendment states: “No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor
in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”16 Initially, the
amendment seems straightforward. During peacetime no soldier may be
quartered in a house without the owner’s consent. The same is true during
wartime; however, in wartime, a law may be enacted setting standards for how
soldiers may be quartered in houses. The difficulty arises in determining
whether CIA and FBI agents are “soldiers” and whether the United States is in
a period of “wartime.”
This article will show that the broad meaning of the term “soldier”
encompasses both CIA and FBI agents. Furthermore, it will show that many of
those agents perform multiple military functions similar to that of traditional
soldiers.

14. CNN.com, FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/
17/fbi.war/index.html (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime].
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
16. Id.
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Regarding what constitutes wartime, Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the
Constitution authorizes Congress to declare war.17 Following that mandate,
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution describing when the President
may introduce the armed forces into hostilities or situations where hostilities
are imminent.18 This article describes how “war,” under both the Constitution
and the War Powers Resolution, can exist under its ordinary meaning without
Congress making a formal declaration of war. However, to convert the legal
status of the nation from peacetime to wartime, a formal declaration of war is
required. Thus, the Third Amendment’s text prevents compelled quartering of
soldiers until Congress declares war. Because Congress has not declared a war
on terrorism, Iraq or North Korea, compelled quartering of soldiers cannot take
place.
Part III of this article provides a historical understanding of the Third
Amendment. Although the Third Amendment has rarely been applied to legal
issues since its ratification, its historical underpinnings date back at least to the
early 1600s in Great Britain. In Great Britain and in the American colonies,
compelled quartering of soldiers took place. Consistent, forthright opposition
to the quartering took place as well, which led to the Third Amendment’s
ratification. The citizen protest, while directed at traditional soldiers, opposed
the government’s actions of quartering one of its agents in a house; thus, the
specific type of military agent quartered is not dispositive of the citizen
sentiment. Finally, the founding period debate regarding whether the United
States should have a standing army in peacetime shows a consistent citizen
distrust of the government’s force and power. Consequently, a Third
Amendment jurisprudence must follow the principle against the compelled
quartering of soldiers and the subordination of the military to the people, thus
protecting the citizenry from the compelled quartering of CIA or FBI agents
today.
Part IV of this article discusses prior cases reviewing the Third
Amendment. The only case directly interpreting the Third Amendment is
Engblom v. Carey.19 In Engblom, striking prison officials were allowed to
proceed on a Third Amendment claim against the governor of New York based
on the state’s quartering of National Guardsmen in the officials’ on-site
residences during a strike.20 While the Court did not focus on the meaning of
“soldier” or “wartime,” its silence was golden. Specifically, the Court did not
mention the Cold War, which at the time was an ongoing political conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Court could not
have viewed the public policy oriented Cold War as constituting wartime. The

17.
18.
19.
20.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 958-59.
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Court did, however, broadly interpret the term “Owner” in the Third
Amendment;21 thus, the terms “soldier” and “wartime” should also be broadly
interpreted. This leads to an affirmance of the textual and historical conclusion
that CIA and FBI agents cannot be quartered in a citizen’s house without the
owner’s consent unless Congress declares war and subsequent quartering is
prescribed through law.
Part V of this article examines two specific areas of constitutional law that
are analogous to the Third Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects the
people from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.22 That
amendment stringently protects the home from government intrusion, as well
as prevents numerous types of agents from effectuating such searches and
seizures. Thus, the Third Amendment must also strongly protect the home
from a wide range of government agents who are considered soldiers, such as
CIA or FBI agents. The right to privacy also supports a civil-liberties-friendly
Third Amendment jurisprudence. The right to privacy was formed partially
because of the Third Amendment’s civil rights protections.23 Therefore, if the
Third Amendment established part of the foundation for the right to privacy,
then Third Amendment jurisprudence must continue to favor citizen privacy
over the compelled quartering of soldiers. Consequently, compelled quartering
of CIA and FBI agents cannot occur in a War on Terrorism, Iraq or North
Korea until Congress declares war, and thereafter, the quartering is prescribed
through law.
In contemporary constitutional disputes, there is a tremendous amount of
material to sort through.24 While legal sources interpreting the Third
Amendment are scant compared with other Bill of Rights provisions, there is
sufficient material available to understand the Third Amendment. We have the
amendment’s text, a wealth of historical materials, a case from the modern era
and analogous areas of the law.25 It is the goal of this article to make more
clear the meaning of the Third Amendment.
II. THE THIRD AMENDMENT’S TEXT
The Constitution’s Preamble states that the people “ordain and establish”
the Constitution.26 Therefore, “before [the Constitution] tells us anything else,

21. Id. at 962.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also infra notes 496-505 and
accompanying text.
24. Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 16970 (2003).
25. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 165 (1990).
26. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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it tells us why we should sit up and take notice [of it].”27 Specifically, the
Constitution declares itself the supreme law of the land and requires judges to
support it through oath or affirmation,28 thereby declaring itself “king.”29 We
must remember that the words of the Constitution have been authoritatively
Consequently, a constitutional analysis begins with the
adopted.30
“constitutional text speaking to [the] precise question.”31 In other words, “the
text itself is an obvious starting point of legal analysis.”32 As Akhil Reed
Amar put it: “[i]s it even possible to deduce the spirit of a law without looking
at its letter?”33
A.

Why the Third Amendment’s Text Must Start the Analysis

When analyzing the Third Amendment, this article will begin with the
Third Amendment’s text. It provides: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war,
but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”34 Because there is little Third
Amendment precedent to address, a return to the amendment’s text is not a
lofty goal, but a necessary starting point when analyzing it. “The absence of
any case law directly construing [the amendment] presents a serious
interpretive problem;”35 thus, the amendment’s language and analogous areas
of law must be analyzed.36 Because of the lack of material analyzing the
amendment’s text, its words bear more importance here. Even for those who
usually eschew an amendment’s text to a footnote with the bulk of the analysis
involving doctrinal precedent, the text must be confronted here to fairly
address the amendment. Few established principles or standards exist beyond
the Third Amendment’s text, therefore the text must be studied and explained
to establish a subsequent legal methodology for it.
This is an appropriate analytical paradigm because “it is always possible in
[] constitutional discourse to appeal behind . . . [doctrinal precedent] to the
document itself, to challenge current wisdom” with what the Constitution
27. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26,
34 (2000).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
29. Amar, supra note 27, at 33.
30. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). See also John Randolph Prince,
Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity,
104 DICK. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999) (noting the Supreme Court should start its analysis with an
amendment’s words, not with “implicit principles”).
32. Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143
(1998).
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
35. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982).
36. Id.
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commands.37 Although the text of the amendment holds special importance, “a
technical and literal reading” of it must be rejected.38 A wholly textualist form
of jurisprudence provides the weakest restraints and is an inappropriate
invitation to creativity because broadly phrased terms allow one to use those
provisions in whatever way desired.39 We must also remember the Third
Amendment was written in a world with a political language distinct from our
own.40 In order to translate the Third Amendment’s meaning into terms
relevant in our modern political world, we need to trace its meaning through
history, case law and analogous area of the law. Therefore, this article’s
analysis begins with and conforms to the Third Amendment’s text, for
“supplementing [the analysis with] judicial opinions, legal writings and other
relevant information is acceptable as long as [they conform to] the text.”41
B.

Rejecting Original Intent to Evaluate the Third Amendment

Because the United States has a written Constitution, we must commit to
following its written text, not what we think those who wrote it meant.42 What
legislators believe a law means is irrelevant.43 Whether we interpret the
Constitution or a statute, it is “the original meaning of its text [that is
analyzed], not what the original draftsmen intended.”44 “The law is what the
law says, and we should [be content] with reading it rather than
psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.”45

37. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 697 (1987).
38. Engblom, 677 F.2d at 962.
39. David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1153, 1157 (1998).
40. Powell, supra note 37, at 672-73.
41. Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause: Why the
Definition of “Equal” Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect
Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 100 (2002) [hereinafter Schmidt,
Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause].
42. Prince, supra note 31, at 7.
43. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
44. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION].
45. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319
(Jackson, J., concurring)). Not only is intent irrelevant, but, history shows early constitutional
interpretation did not focus on the Founders’ personal intentions, but on the “original intent” of
the sovereign parties to the constitutional compact evidenced through constitutional text and
“discerned through structural methods of interpretation.” H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985). But see Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 93 (1988)
(arguing that the original intent theory emerged soon after the Constitution was ratified).
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Therefore, a “court cannot . . . be influenced by the construction placed
upon [a law] by individual[s]” involved in its debate and passage because the
will of the majority is spoken in the act itself.46 This means the views of
draftsmen, such as Alexander Hamilton, bear no more authority than the views
of non-draftsmen, such as Thomas Jefferson, in determining the meaning of the
Constitution.47 As James Madison, a draftsman, stated: “[a]s a guide in
expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and
incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character.”48
Madison felt that “the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived
from the text itself.”49 Thus, he believed the intentions or opinions of those
that planned and proposed the Constitution should not be used to interpret the
Constitution’s meaning.50
The debates at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention were held in
secret51 and the proceedings were not officially preserved and published.
Therefore, the original understanding of what occurred there “did not greatly
matter.”52 Some members of the Philadelphia convention went as far as
recommending the convention’s journals be destroyed and its minutes
burned.53
Similarly, prior drafts of the Third Amendment shed no authoritative light
on the final amendment’s meaning. “The text’s the thing,”54 so, we should
ignore drafting history as opposed to relying on rejected drafts to interpret the
final, binding version of the Third Amendment.55 The only definite fact we
know about prior drafts of an amendment or law is that they were rejected.
Attempting to string together a series of rejected drafts to determine what the
46. Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845). See also Philip P. Frickey,
Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving
Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 205 n.31 (1999) (directing attention to “Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 n.† (1998) (noting that Justice Scalia joins in the
entire opinion with the exception of a section that discusses and rejects a party’s appeal to
legislative history); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n.[†] (1997) (noting
that Justice Scalia joins in the entire opinion with the exception of a footnote which discusses and
rejects the use of legislative history in construing the statute at issue)”).
47. Tome, 513 U.S. at 167 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), reprinted in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 447 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 447-48.
51. Paul Finkleman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 356 (1989).
52. Id. at 353. (citing L.W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 2
(1988)).
53. Id. at 353-54.
54. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
55. Id.
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final draft means places rejected versions of an amendment or law in an
authoritative position when interpreting the final, binding version. We will
never know exactly why changes were made to previous drafts of legislation.
The hundreds, if not thousands, of people associated with drafting and ratifying
legislation most likely made drafting changes for a multitude of imprecise
reasons. Some changes reflect political compromises, some reflect quid pro
quo scenarios, some reflect political overtones or the issues of the day and
some simply reflect grammatical or structural concerns. Just as we cannot put
our finger on the collective original intent behind a law, we cannot definitively
determine why each change was made to each draft of eventually-passed
legislation.
Even if we were to plunge into an original intent analysis of the Third
Amendment, whose intent behind it mattered?56 Should we consider those
involved in the Philadelphia convention only, or should we include the views
from those involved in the state ratification conventions as well?57 More
specifically, “do we [consider the intent of] all those who attended the
Philadelphia convention, or only those who signed the Constitution?”58 If we
consider the state conventions, do we consider all those who attended or just
those who voted for the Constitution?59 And did all those involved intend the
Third Amendment to mean the same thing, and how would we prove any of
that?60 With little or no record available concerning the intent of those
involved in enacting the Third Amendment, we must accept that the original
intent of the Third Amendment is irrelevant and impossible to determine. In
sum, the meaning of the Third Amendment’s text, and not anyone’s intentions
of it, binds us as law.61

56. See Prince, supra note 31, at 13.
57. Id.
58. Finkelman, supra note 51, at 356.
59. Id.
60. See Prince, supra note 31, at 13. See also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment
and the “Jurisprudence of Original Intention,” 74 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1721-22 (1986) (citing
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 98–110 (1962) (asserting that the Founders’ intentions cannot be ascertained with
finality)) (describing the Constitution as not “ratified by a single actor with clear motivations, but
by many participants, most of whom left little or no record of their intentions”); Laurence H.
Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 95, 96 (1987) (explaining that many Founders were in Congress and the ratifying
assemblies, speaking at many times).
61. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra
note 44, at 65. Because the Constitution vests the entire Congress with all legislative powers in
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, the views of a select few in Congress cannot constitute the meaning of a
law. See generally Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 44, at 35.
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C. What is a “Soldier?”
The definition of soldier is not limited to one narrow meaning. A soldier is
“one engaged in military service and [especially] in the army”.62 Similarly, a
soldier can be “an enlisted man or woman.”63 One engaged in enlisted military
service is a soldier, but one need not be engaged in such military service to be
a soldier. A soldier can also be “a skilled warrior”64 or “a militant leader,
follower, or worker.”65 Because a soldier can be “a skilled warrior”66 or “a
militant leader, follower, or worker,”67 a soldier need not be formally linked to
the armed services. As such, a broader meaning applies to soldier.
1.

Is a CIA Agent a Soldier?

The National Security Act created the CIA in 1947.68 The Director of
Central Intelligence “coordinat[es] the nation’s intelligence activities and
correlat[es], evaluat[es] and disseminat[es] intelligence [that] affects national
security.”69 The CIA is responsible to the President through the Director of
Central Intelligence and accountable to Congress’s intelligence oversight
committees.70 Thus, the CIA has the general framework of the traditional
military. The CIA is part of the executive branch with the President at the top
of the hierarchy, just as the President, as Commandeer-in-Chief, sits atop the
armed forces.71
The CIA’s mission directly relates to military oriented functions. The CIA
supports the President, the National Security Council, and all officials who
make and execute national security policy by “[p]roviding accurate,
comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics.”72
Furthermore, the CIA operates to ensure that a “battlefield commander . . .

62. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 150TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 1097
(1981) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S]. See also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1228 (William Morris ed., 1981) [hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE]
(defining a soldier as one who serves in the army).
63. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1097. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at
1228 (indicating that the meaning of soldier is also an enlisted man or a noncommissioned officer
as distinguished from a commissioned officer).
64. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1097.
65. Id. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1228 (defining a soldier also as an
active or loyal follower or worker).
66. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1097.
67. Id. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1228 (defining a soldier also as an
active or loyal follower or worker).
68. Central Intelligence Agency, About the CIA, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/
info.html (last modified Jun. 9, 2003) [hereinafter About the CIA].
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
72. About the CIA, supra note 68 (emphasis added).
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receives the best intelligence possible.”73 To further military-like operations,
the CIA created special multidisciplinary centers to address issues such as
counterterrorism, counterintelligence and arms control intelligence.74
The CIA has separate leadership positions for homeland security
intelligence and foreign intelligence. An “Associate Director of Central
Intelligence for Homeland Security, Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence, ensures the flow of intelligence in support of homeland
defense.”75 The CIA also has a Directorate of Operations who “is responsible
for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence.”76 Accordingly, the CIA,
as part of its normal operations, transmits intelligence information in order to
protect the nation from military attack.77
This description of CIA activities might most directly correlate with the
job duties CIA or FBI agents would perform in a quartering scenario. The
secretive collection of foreign intelligence is exactly what a quartered CIA
agent would be doing while investigating a terrorist, Iraqi or North Korean
military plot. This type of mental combat, or attempting to defeat an enemy
with the mind instead of the fist, is still military-like activity because a federal
executive department agent uses his skills and training to defeat an enemy. It
is at least the action of a “skilled warrior,”78 as it requires using highly skilled
tactics in a committed, courageous operation. A CIA agent, heavily trained in
intelligence gathering and surveillance, is a skilled servant of the Executive
Branch, just as an infantryman is a highly trained member of the armed forces
of the Executive Branch. Finally, CIA agents committed to preventing another
terrorist or military attack are dedicated and courageous warriors just like
traditional infantrymen putting their bodies in front of an enemy bullet.
The CIA’s Office of Military Affairs (OMA) corroborates the contention
that CIA agents conduct soldier-like operations. OMA is designed to provide
deployed armed forces with “the full range of [the] CIA’s intelligence and
operational support capabilities.”79 OMA has “military detailees from all the
uniformed [s]ervices.”80 Thus, the CIA is directly connected with all branches
of the armed forces. A military detailee from a uniformed military branch, is
as close to a traditional soldier as possible.
More importantly, the OMA internet page contains a handful of pictures
equating to a thousand words. The top of the page contains pictures of, from
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See About the CIA, supra note 68.
78. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
79. Central Intelligence Agency, OMA at a Glance, at http://www.cia.gov/oma/oma.html
(last updated Oct. 24, 2002) [hereinafter OMA at a Glance].
80. Id.
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left to right, a stealth bomber, a large ship that appears to be an aircraft carrier,
a uniformed man appearing to be in the Marines and uniformed personnel in a
tank-like vehicle.81 Below those pictures appears a picture of four hats of the
armed services.82 These images are undeniably those of soldiers. If the CIA is
directly linked with these soldiers in its actions, support and personnel, how
can a CIA agent not be a soldier as well? The CIA, through OMA, is
inextricably linked with the military and armed services. Consequently, the
CIA admits it “is a part of the broader ‘military support team.’”83
If the CIA provides support for the military and is part of the military team,
how can its agents not be soldiers? Certainly military personnel of the Air
Force, Army, Marines and Navy are soldiers. Because the CIA is part of that
military support team, its agents are also soldiers. OMA’s principal business
involves soldier-like duties including the following:
Agency support for military exercises; direct support . . . to the commanders in
chief of the major unified commands; support . . . to the major service schools
and war colleges; an active training and education . . . program aimed at
informing [CIA] officers about unique military needs and explaining to
military audiences how [the] CIA can respond to their requirements; . . .
[assessing battle damage; assisting in military liaison functions and] ensuring
systems interoperability between CIA and military sites.84

OMA’s duties read like a laundry list of military functions that soldiers
perform. OMA has its hands in multiple components of military operations, all
requiring and engaging military goals. If the CIA’s office is considered the
Office of Military Affairs, then those agents conducting military duties must be
soldiers in that capacity. Accordingly, a CIA agent in this context, quartered
in a person’s house, would meet the definition of a soldier.
Finally, the CIA’s role in covert military operations shows its agents are
soldiers in that capacity. The CIA “asserted that the [President] has the power
to authorize the use of covert paramilitary force.”85 Specifically, Special
Counsel to the CIA argued that the President could undertake covert action
because of his inherent power to conduct foreign affairs.86 In fact, the United
States became involved in a foreign, “internal civil [war] through the use of
private paramilitary forces working under the direction of officers or

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. OMA at a Glance, supra note 79.
85. Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (1986).
86. Id. at 1037 n.12 (citing U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of
Foreign Intelligence: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 172934 (1975) (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the Director of the CIA)).
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employees of the CIA.”87 “In the late 1940’s the CIA organized guerrilla
operations against several eastern European countries, and between 1953 and
1973 the CIA used paramilitary troops in at least eight major efforts against
foreign governments.”88 CIA military operations have occurred in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and the Bay of Pigs in Cuba.89
The CIA dedicates an entire page on its internet Web site describing its
actions in the War on Terrorism.90 The CIA’s description of its activities
against terrorism details how the entire agency confronts terrorism on a global
scale. In the mid-1980s, then CIA Director William Casey “created the DCI
Counterterrorist Center (CTC) [in order to] preempt, disrupt and defeat
terrorists.”91 According to the CIA, “CTC’s mission is to assist the [CIA
Director] in coordinating the counterterrorist efforts of the Intelligence
Community” by implementing counterterrorist operations to collect
intelligence on and minimize terrorist capabilities, producing in-depth analyses
of terrorist groups and coordinating the intelligence community’s
counterterrorist activities.92 The CTC “[f]urnishes daily detailed information
on terrorist-related intelligence to national-level policymakers from the
President through sub-Cabinet level officers and members of Congress.”93
Moreover, it provides intelligence to the State Department for use with foreign
governments in order to “thwart terrorism.”94 The CTC also provides
warnings of “impending terrorist operation[s] to those who can counter the
threat.”95
The CTC directly supports the military overseas. CTC’s direct intelligence
support for the military is its highest priority;96 specifically, the CTC protects
the military by determining the modus operandi of terrorists that might operate

87. Id. at 1049.
88. Id. at 1050 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-2, at 145, 148 (1977); Falk, CIA, Covert Action and
International Law, SOCIETY, Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 39, 40-41).
89. Id. at 1049 n.64 (citing S. KUMAR, CIA AND THE THIRD WORLD (1981); V. MARCHETTI
& J. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 113-25 (1974); P. WYDEN, BAY OF
PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY (1979)).
90. See Central Intelligence Agency, The War on Terrorism, at http://www.cia.gov/
terrorism/index.html (last updated Jun. 9, 2003). The CIA is also following the North Korea
situation. Omestad, supra note 12, at 21. The CIA estimates North Korea could produce bombready uranium in mid-to-late 2004. Id. The North Korean situation might intersect with the War
on Terrorism and the war against Iraq as the CIA concluded North Korea will sell nuclear
material to rogue states or terrorists if its nuclear reprocessing succeeds. Id.
91. Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Counterterrorist Center, at http://www.cia.gov/
terrorism/ctc.html (last updated Apr. 12, 2002) [hereinafter DCI Counterterrorist Center].
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. DCI Counterterrorist Center, supra note 91.
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near United States troops, ensuring that the military receives quick and usable
intelligence and maintaining direct contact with military intelligence units at
all major commands.97
Part of the CTC’s mission is to pursue major terrorists overseas and help
the FBI bring terrorists to justice.98 The CTC and the FBI “began exchanging
senior-level officers to help manage the counterterrorist offices at both
agencies.”99 Through this effort, the United States has brought a number of
terrorists to justice.100
The CIA, working with the FBI, seeks to capture terrorists alive when
possible.101 However, the current Bush Administration prepared a list of
terrorist leaders the CIA is authorized to kill “if capture is impractical and
civilian casualties can be minimized.”102 Specifically, President Bush provided
written legal authority to the CIA to “hunt down and kill the terrorists.”103
If the CIA performs intelligence, apprehension, analytical and warning
actions regarding terrorism while arguing for authority to conduct paramilitary
affairs, then it is admitting that it performs military functions. The CTC
confronts terrorists and potential terrorists from as many angles as possible.
Because President George W. Bush authorized the CIA to capture or kill
terrorists, those CIA agents following that mission are conducting military
affairs as soldiers. Capturing or killing the enemy is a soldier’s basic,
fundamental role. Essentially, when the President authorizes a CIA agent to
capture or kill an enemy, that CIA agent is a soldier. Any assertion to the
contrary would be nonsensical.
The CIA was intricately involved in the war against Iraq even before its
beginning. For almost a year before the conflict commenced on March 19,
2003, the CIA was operating under presidential authority to overthrow Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein through covert actions.104 The CIA had “authority to
use lethal force and a two hundred million dollar budget to bring about a
change of government.”105 Once again, CIA agents were conducting covert
actions of a military nature with presidential authority to kill an enemy.
Besides this type of unquestionably soldier-like activity of trying to topple an
enemy and kill it, the CIA provided intelligence for the military. On March 19,

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. James Risen & David Johnston, Bush Has Widened Authority of CIA to Kill Terrorists,
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at 1.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Walter Pincus et al., U.S. Thinks it Hit Compound with Hussein Inside, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A1.
105. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE

601

2003, before combat started, CIA Director George Tenet and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld presented President Bush with a plan to launch a
strategic strike against a location where Hussein and his top commanders were
believed to be.106 The CIA apparently gained intelligence on Hussein’s
suspected whereabouts from human intelligence and satellite images.107 After
meeting with Tenet and others and receiving one last intelligence update,
President Bush authorized the strategic attack, which occurred at
approximately 9:45 p.m. eastern standard time.108 Therefore, the conflict
commenced because of CIA recommendations on where and when to strike
Iraq. How much more military and soldier-like can a function be? The strike
missed Hussein, and Hussein appeared on Iraqi television shortly after the
attack.109 The CIA continued its military function though, and confirmed it
was Hussein, not a body double, appearing on television (but it was unsure if
the tape was recorded).110 On December 14, 2003, United States troops
captured Saddam Hussein alive.111
This description of CIA agents verifies that those agents who are directly
engaged in intelligence gathering, national security or military affairs would be
soldiers in a Third Amendment context. Obviously, those would be the type of
agents quartered in a house to investigate an enemy. Thus, in that situation,
those agents would be soldiers for Third Amendment purposes.
Regarding the general quartering of CIA agents for protection from
threatened attacks on their residences and offices, if the type of agent described
previously was quartered for general purposes, and not to perform any job
function, the agent would still be considered a soldier because of the agent’s
basic job functions. CIA agents not necessarily linked with national security or
military affairs who would be quartered for general residency purposes only,
would still meet the textual meaning of soldier. The agents’ knowledge and
expertise, coupled with their dedication to the United States, makes them both
“skilled warriors”112 and “militant leaders, followers, or workers.”113
Accordingly, under the broad meaning of soldier, CIA agents would be
considered soldiers under the Third Amendment. But what of FBI agents?

106. Ron Hutcheson, Bush Shifted Strategy with Just Minutes to Go, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A16.
107. Pincus et al., supra note 104.
108. Hutcheson, supra note 106.
109. William Bunch, 16 Allied Troops Die in Copter Crash, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 21, 2003, at 5.
110. Id.
111. Chris Susan Sachs, Arrest by U.S. Soldiers—President Still Cautions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2003, at A1.
112. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
113. See id.
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Is an FBI Agent a Soldier?

The FBI is a field-oriented organization that “provide[s] program direction
and support to fifty-six field offices, approximately 400 satellite offices . . .,
four specialized field installations, and over forty foreign liaison posts.”114 The
FBI has approximately 11,000 special agents and 16,000 other employees who
perform professional, administrative, technical, clerical, craft, trade or
maintenance operations.115 About 9,800 employees are assigned to FBI
Headquarters and nearly 18,000 are assigned to field installations.116
The
FBI
has
an
Executive
Assistant
Director
for
Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence.117 The Counterintelligence Division
activities include domestic security,118 and it “consolidates all FBI
The FBI’s full-time counterterrorism
counterterrorism initiatives.”119
contingent is slightly more than 2,000 agents, but an additional 5,000 to 10,000
agents can be shifted to prevent domestic terrorism.120 Thus, the FBI is
countering terrorism or the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, FBI agents
rebuffing or preventing terrorism are rebuffing or preventing military attacks.
Are not those agents’ goals, objectives and mission the same as an enlisted
soldier rebuffing and preventing terrorism or an enemy military?
“The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the National
Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) are assigned to [the Counterterrorism
Division].”121 As the FBI states on its internet site:
The NIPC serves as the US Government’s focal point for threat assessment,
warning, investigation, and response for threats or attacks against the United
States’ critical infrastructures. The NDPO coordinates all federal efforts to
assist state and local first responders with planning, training, and equipment
needs necessary to respond to a conventional or non-conventional weapons of
mass destruction incident.122

114. Federal Bureau of Investigation, General Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/faqs/faqsone.htm (last visted Nov. 4, 2003).
115. Id.
116. Federal Bureau of Investigation, About Us, at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus.htm (Dec. 6,
2002).
117. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Executives, at http://www.fbi.gov/libref/executives/
asstmain.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
118. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigative Programs, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/
area.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Investigative Programs].
119. Id.
120. FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime, supra note 14.
121. Investigative Programs, supra note 118. The FBI’s Executive Assistant Director for
Law Enforcement Services oversees the Critical Incidents Response Group, which “deploy[s]
investigative specialists to respond to terrorist activities.” Critical Incident Response Group,
Mission Statement, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/isd/cirg/mission.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
122. Investigative Programs, supra note 118.
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The NIPC and NDPO are specifically designed as national defense
organizations underneath the counterterrorism umbrella. If their national
defense operations were not labeled under an FBI subdivision, one would
presume that an armed forces branch or branches conducted them. Because
these operations are military operations, military personnel would naturally be
expected to conduct them.
The FBI is directly involved with the War on Terrorism. The media has
reported that “FBI Director Robert Mueller and other top FBI officials . . . said
their greatest concern is unknown al Qaeda-backed sleeper cells that may be in
the United States” ready to commit a terrorist attack.123 To help prevent such
an attack, known Islamic extremists are under FBI surveillance and the FBI is
closely monitoring terrorist organization members.124 On the international
scale, “the FBI continues to upgrade its presence and cooperation with other
governments” in order to protect United States facilities and interests abroad
from attack.125 To complete this task and pursue suspected terrorists, the FBI
stationed agents in forty-five countries.126 The FBI had some success abroad.
Specifically, it arrested a high-ranking member of al Qaeda, Khalid Shakh
Mohammed, in the spring of 2003.127 After the arrest, the FBI tried to disrupt
his financial network overseas and gained valuable information from him.128
The FBI reportedly learned that a suspected al Qaeda terrorist was planning an
attack against the United States and it issued a worldwide alert in order to
locate him.129 In August 2003, federal officials arrested an arms dealer trying
to sell shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles to an undercover customer
working for the FBI.130 Around the same time, a truck bomb exploded at the
United Nations headquarters in Iraq.131 The FBI probe into the attack
determined that the explosives were similar to those used by Iraq’s armed
forces.132

123. FBI Readies Home Front for Wartime, supra note 14. al Qaeda is a worldwide terrorist
organization generally considered responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks against the
United States.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. CNN.com, Mueller: FBI Interviews Useful to War in Iraq, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
LAW/03/27/fbi.iraqis/index.html (Mar. 27, 2003).
128. Id.
129. Shannon McCaffrey, Suspected al-Qaeda Operative is Sought, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 2003, at A23.
130. Cnn.com, Feds Tell How the Weapons Sting was Played, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
LAW/08/13/arms.sting.details/index.html (Aug. 14, 2003).
131. The New York Times, FBI: Iraqi Military-Type Explosives Used in Attack, at
http://partners.nytimes.com/ref/international/CNN-BOX-ARTICLE.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2003).
132. Id.
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The FBI is also directly involved in the war against Iraq. The FBI
interviewed approximately 10,000 Iraqi citizens and former citizens living in
the United States.133 According to the FBI, the interviews “helped lead the
U.S. military to key sites during the war in Iraq.”134 The interviews led to 250
reports that helped American troops locate, in Director Mueller’s words,
“weapons production and storage facilities, underground bunkers, fiber optic
networks, and Iraqi detention and interrogation facilities.”135 The FBI also
arrested “more than 100 Iraqis of concern to authorities who are believed to be
in the [United States] unlawfully.”136
If FBI agents perform soldier-like duties, then they are soldiers. In this
instance, the overall description of the FBI’s specific counterterrorism and
security measures are the type of military duties a soldier would perform to
combat terrorists or a military enemy. Moreover, the FBI’s actions in relation
to the War on Terrorism and the war against Iraq verify that thousands of FBI
agents perform investigative, preventive, and specific military support
functions for the United States. This type of reconnaissance and informationgathering directly in relation to the War on Terrorism and the war against Iraq
shows that FBI agents are soldiers in that regard. Essentially, just as a CIA
agent quartered in a house to perform intelligence, national security, and
military affairs is a soldier, so is an FBI agent when acting in that capacity.
Finally, FBI agents not necessarily linked with intelligence, national
security, or military affairs (who would be quartered for general residency
purposes only) would still meet the textual meaning of soldier, just as CIA
agents in this respect did. Their knowledge and expertise, coupled with their
dedication to the United States, makes them both “skilled warriors” and
“militant leaders, followers, or workers.”137 Consequently, FBI agents meet
the broad meaning of soldier.

133. CNN.com, FBI: Iraqi Interviews Provided Helpful Info for War, at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/LAW/04/17/sprj.irq.ashcroft.mueller/index/html (Apr. 17, 2003).
134. Id.
135. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
136. McCaffrey, supra note 129.
137. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. The use of broad meanings of soldier to
conclude a CIA or FBI agent meets the textual meaning of soldier exemplifies why this article
only uses the text as a starting point in legal analysis. Limiting the evaluation of what soldier
means to a broad dictionary definition would eliminate numerous authoritative materials helping
determine what a soldier is, which might lead to an incorrect result. Consequently, this article
complies with the text and does not eschew other materials, such as history, case law, analogous
areas of law or other materials to fully and fairly address the issue of whether a CIA or FBI agent
is a soldier.
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D. What is “Time of Peace?”
The Third Amendment refers to a prohibition against quartering soldiers
“in time of peace.”138 While peace seems to be the controlling term, the
amendment’s reference to time of peace refers to when peace occurs or a state
of peace. Dictionaries containing a definition for “peacetime” best define what
the phrase time of peace means because peacetime combines the words within
the phrase into one word. Peacetime specifically addresses peace in accord
with time, blending the phrase “time of peace” into one cohesive word defining
the phrase at issue. Accordingly, the term “peacetime” most accurately
conveys the meaning of time of peace in reference to time of peace and time of
war.
With that said, it is necessary to define peacetime. It is “a time when a
nation is not at war.”139 Therefore, the meaning of peacetime cannot be
defined without defining the meaning of war. In fact, war essentially defines
peacetime, because peacetime exists when war does not. Accordingly, a
further look into what peacetime means can only be done by defining what war
means. Once the meaning of war is determined, the definition of peacetime
will come to bear. If the United States is at war, then peacetime is not present.
On the other hand, if the United States is not at war, then peacetime exists.
Peacetime and war, thus, are mutually exclusive terms. One cannot exist with
the other. Rather, either war exists or peacetime exists.
E.

What is “Time of War?”

While the meanings of soldier and peacetime appear ascertainable through
dictionary definitions, the terms war and wartime are more complex. The most
appropriate way to define “time of war” is to refer to the meaning of
“wartime,” just as the term peacetime is the best way to define time of peace.
Wartime means “a period during which a war is in progress.”140 Therefore, we
have to define war because wartime exists when a war occurs. However, the
word war has been, is and will continue to be one of the most difficult words to
define in the English language.
As such, war must be evaluated through its own interpretive paradigm. In
other words, just as this article examines what the Third Amendment means
through its text, history, case law and analogous areas of law, the word war
must enter and exit this analytical assembly line in order to ascertain its
meaning. While the methodology is based on the same framework of this
article, there is one minor change. Because case law provides a historical
138. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
139. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 835. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at
963 (defining peacetime as a time of absence of war).
140. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1311. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at
1446 (defining wartime as “[a] period or time of war”).
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review of what war is, a historical understanding of war and case law defining
war are not separate subsections, but a combined subsection discussing the
historical understanding of war.
1.

The Textual Meaning of War

“The dividing line between a state of war and a state of peace has never
been clear.”141 The task of defining war is further exacerbated because it is a
word that everyone understands the meaning of, but that “few can definitely
define.”142 Asking what war means “is a question so enigmatic[, for example],
that [the federal executive and legislative] branches cannot agree . . . on an
answer any more specific than the [grand] understatement that an unprovoked
attack on American forces on the scale of Pearl Harbor would . . . [cause the
President to consider] requesting a declaration of war.”143 To break through
this confusion and provide a specific meaning of war it must first be
understood in its two contexts—its ordinary meaning found in dictionaries and
its legal meaning found in the United States Constitution.
a.

The Legal Meaning of War Applies Over its Ordinary Meaning

Unlike the terms soldier and time of peace, war has a textual explanatory
reference in the United States Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 (the
Declare War Clause) states: “Congress shall have Power . . . To declare
War.”144 Therefore, an argument exists that a court cannot take judicial notice
of a war until Congress, as the war-making body, makes some act or
declaration creating or recognizing its existence.145
Thus, before war is defined, the question is whether war should be given
its ordinary meaning, based on dictionary definitions, or should be given its
legal meaning based on the Declare War Clause. On the one hand, the Third
Amendment does not mention the Declare War Clause, nor does it refer to a
declaration of war. The Third Amendment does not state: “No Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor
in time of [declared] war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law” or “No
Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent
of the Owner, nor after [Congress declared] war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.” Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the key phrase, “time
of war,” seems to be the textual key to unlocking the word’s meaning. The
141. Mark T. Uyeda, Note, Presidential Prerogative Under the Constitution to Deploy U.S.
Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, 44 DUKE L.J. 777, 777 (1995).
142. Weissman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420, 421 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
143. J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 38 (1991) (citing Crisis in the
Persian Gulf: Hearings and Markup Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong.
104-05 (1990)).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
145. Weissman, 112 F. Supp. at 422.
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argument proceeds that if the Constitution’s Framers wanted to add the
hypothetical language expressed above, they could have, particularly in light of
the fact that a federal statute was passed not long after the Constitution was
ratified containing that type of language. The Alien Enemy Act146 authorizes
the President to, among other things, remove certain alien enemies
“[w]henever there is a declared war . . . or any invasion.”147 Thus, the notion
is that because Congress expressed that it could premise presidential statutory
war-power authority on a declared war, the same could have been placed in the
Third Amendment if a declaration of war was necessary to constitute a war.
That may appear correct, but it is off-point and off-issue, and thus, incorrect.
Here, the legal, constitutional meaning of war is at issue. Because the
Constitution speaks to what war is and how it commences, that legal,
constitutional meaning of war must be followed to define what war means in a
Third Amendment sense. That requires a reasonable reading of two
complementary constitutional texts—the Third Amendment and the Declare
War Clause. Defining war only through its ordinary meaning would eschew
the Declare War Clause and apply the ordinary meaning of a word that has a
constitutional explanatory reference. The ordinary meaning of war has its
place—in resolving legal issues surrounding the ordinary meaning of war.
That, however, is not at issue here.
Reliance on the ordinary meaning of war provides constitutional
interpretive problems. “A text should not be construed strictly . . . or leniently;
[instead,] it should be construed reasonably, [in order to entail] all that it fairly
means.”148 With the Constitution providing an explanatory provision for the
meaning of the word war outside of its reference in the Third Amendment, it is
unreasonable to interpret war without reference to that constitutional corollary
and similar provisions balancing congressional and presidential war power.
Therefore, a purely textualist approach to defining war through its ordinary
meaning, thereby ignoring its legal meaning, is not a reasonable construction
of war.149
146. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Scalia, supra note 44, at 23.
149. If the ordinary meaning of war applied to this issue, the War on Terrorism would not be
a war, while the war against Iraq and a possible conflict with North Korea would be a war.
Specifically, a war is “a state of usu. open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or
nations.” WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1309. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at
1444 (defining war as a state of open, armed, and often prolonged conflict carried on between
nations, states, or parties). It is “a period of such armed conflict.” WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at
1309. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1444 (defining war as a period of such
conflict). A war is also “a state of hostility, conflict, or antagonism.” WEBSTER’S, supra note 62,
at 1309. See also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 1444 (defining war as any condition of
active antagonism or contention or an active state of conflict or contention). Finally, a war is a
“struggle between opposing forces or for a particular end” or “to be in active or vigorous
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conflict.” WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 1309. While WEBSTER’S indicates that a war can be an
open and declared conflict, the majority of its meaning indicates that war can occur without a
declaration. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
At the outset, therefore, the undeclared war against Iraq involving 242,000 United States
troops, massive military resources, and numerous casualties meets all meanings of war above,
except for those calling for a declaration. CNN.com, War Tracker: March 19, at
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/war.tracker/03.19.index.html (Mar. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter War Tracker: March 19]; see supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. Similarly,
a traditional ground, air and sea conflict between the United States and North Korea involving
hundreds of thousands of troops, massive military resources and numerous casualties would meet
all the meanings of war mentioned previously as well, except those requiring a declaration.
On the other hand, the War on Terrorism does not fit the ordinary meaning of war. First,
there is no open and declared armed hostile conflict. While the United States has initiated a War
on Terrorism, the conflict is against a thing—terrorism—not a nation, state or organization.
Obviously, a thing, such as terrorism, cannot declare anything. A conflict, hostility or
antagonism necessarily appears to involve a dispute between two persons, nations, states or
organizations. Thus, it appears textually impossible for a conflict, hostility or antagonism to exist
in the War on Terrorism because terrorism, a thing, cannot form an opinion, mental state or
physical confrontation inapposite to the United States. The declaration of war by some terrorists
or a terrorist organization like al Qaeda, the organization generally considered responsible for the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, would be insufficient because some terrorists cannot declare
something for all terrorists. As time goes on, different actions by different groups can be
considered terrorism, and a threat of terrorism, to some degree, will always be present. Thus, as
the name shows, the “War on Terrorism” seems to be more of a declared policy war, in a national
security sense, like the War on Drugs is a policy war against the evils of drugs. Despite the fact
that this conclusion might textually dispose of the question regarding whether a war could exist,
given that one participant is only a thing, this article will further analyze if a war can exist against
terrorism based on war’s meaning incorporating undeclared conflicts.
The conflict between the United States and terrorists has not been open. Instead, it has
been secretive and closed. The foundation of the terrorists’ success flows from the secretive
nature of their whereabouts, training, funding and next form and place of attack. They apparently
move from place to place, train from place to place, and attack at different times and places.
While some aspects of the War on Terrorism are open, such as legislation, funding, and the
commitment of resources, (see supra note 1), many of the United States’ efforts are secretive as
well. These efforts include the prosecution of individuals in military tribunals, secret
immigration proceedings, the detention of combatants in Cuba and certain CIA and FBI
intelligence operations. See supra note 1.
Next, the War on Terrorism is not a period or state of armed conflict or similar
hostilities. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were armed. However, since then, there has
not been an armed strike against the domestic United States. The United States quickly unseated
al Qaeda and the ruling Taliban government in Afghanistan shortly after the first official United
States and allied air strikes there on October 7, 2001. Romesh Ratnescar, Afghanistan: One Year
Later,
at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/timep.afghanistan.year.later.tm/
index.html (Oct. 10, 2003). The United States-led coalition had 11,500 soldiers in Afghanistan
on September 1, 2003. Taliban ambush patrols killed eight Afghans. USA Today, Taliban
Ambush Patrols, Killing 8 Afghans, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-09-01-afghanfighting_x.htm (Sept. 1, 2003). Fortunately only approximately twenty-five American soldiers
have died there. Ratnescar, supra. Terrorists appear to plan for disputatious bursts of violence,
while the United States actively attempts to prevent such attacks. Thus, everyday terrorist
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Next, a strict interpretation of the Third Amendment focuses on what is not
said in the amendment as opposed to what is said. The hypothetical examples
mentioned previously of language the Third Amendment could contain is not
what the amendment contains. While analyzing what an amendment does not
contain sheds light on its meaning, a look at what it actually contains is
paramount. In this instance, because the amendment was ratified after the
Declare War Clause, there may have been no need to mention in it that a
declared war had to exist. This is so because the Declare War Clause already
existed and explained what war was. Thus, adding further explanatory
language in the Third Amendment might have been redundant.
b.

Legal Meaning of the Declare War Clause

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 is the constitutional provision establishing
Congress’s power to declare war. While a debate exists concerning whether
“declare” means “authorize,” there is less dispute that a declaration of war
alters the legal status of the nation from peacetime to wartime. The War
Powers Resolution provides modern legislation describing when Congress
authorizes the President to execute the armed forces, thereby furthering
Congress’s power to determine war powers and wartime state of affairs.
i.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11

This clause states: “Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.”150 It
is subject to differing interpretation. On the one hand, the clause is read (as
this author believes is accurate) to mean that only Congress can declare or start
a war, absent an emergency situation wherein the President, as Commander-inChief of the armed forces,151 could act unilaterally to defend the United States
and protect the states from invasion.152 On the other hand, the clause is not
interpreted as requiring congressional authorization for war, thereby increasing
presidential war powers. Fortunately, both sides of the Declare War Clause
debate express that a declaration of war formally alters peacetime status to
wartime status; thus, a declaration of war is required to change the Third
Amendment’s peacetime status to wartime. This section begins with the

activity appears to be on the planning and preparation side, while United States activity generally
focuses on investigation and prevention. Accordingly, neither the facts of the situation, nor the
apparent objectives of either side constitute a time period or state of armed conflict.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
152. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.” Id. See Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.
Supp. 1249, 1255 (D.D.C. 1973).
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argument that a formal declaration is required to begin a war, followed by the
counter-argument.
“Declare” is the key word in the Declare War Clause’s statement that
“Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.”153 John Hart Ely
“understands this language to mean ‘[a]cts of war must be authorized by
Congress.’”154
Because the language grants Congress the exclusive
responsibility “to resolve the necessity and appropriateness of war as an
instrument of national policy,” the power is nondelegable.155 In other words,
“if the power to initiate hostilities is one of Congress’s ‘essential legislative
functions’ it may not be delegated to the President.”156 Therefore, the text
reserves to Congress alone the power to pursue “sustained extraterritorial uses
of direct force.”157 The President is not granted lawmaking or, more
specifically, war-making power.158 The Constitution proclaims the President
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,159 but no war-making power is
granted to the President in the Commander-in-Chief Clause.160 Because the
Constitution grants Congress all the powers naturally connected with the
power to declare war,161 except the command power, the President does not
have war-making power absent his ability to repel sudden attacks against the
United States in an effort to protect its republican form of government and the
states from invasion under Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution.162 The
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. See Patrick O. Gudridge, War and Responsibility: A
Symposium on Congress, the President, and the Authority to Initiate Hostilities, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 81, 82 (1995).
154. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 82. (quoting JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 10 (1993)).
155. William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A
Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1972).
156. Bennett C. Rushkoff, Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J.
1330, 1335 (1984) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529
(1935) (determining Congress cannot abdicate or transfer the essential legislative functions with
which the Constitution vested it)).
157. Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 16.
158. Id. at 16-17.
159. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
160. Raoul Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 41 (1972).
161. See infra pp. 174-76.
162. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (D.D.C. 1973)
(stating that the President has the power under Article IV, Section 4 to use troops or militia to
quench a civil disorder). See also Berger, supra note 160, at 41; Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,
613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NATIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 264 (1998); Edwin B.
Firmage, Rogue Presidents and the War Powers of Congress, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 79, 80
(1988) (noting that Congress has complete power to decide on war and peace and the President
may respond to sudden attacks without Congressional authorization); William M. Goldsmith, A
New Look at an Old Argument, 11 GEO. MASON. U. L. REV. 65, 77 (1988) (noting Presidentmade war is justified only in defense of the United States, otherwise Congress should perform its
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Commander-in-Chief conducts a war; he does not commence, continue or
conclude one.163 Congress authorizes war; the President commands forces
after a declaration of war.164

constitutional duties through a small committee drawn from both houses reflecting bipartisan
leadership); Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1337 (noting that the President may initiate force in an
emergency based on Commander-in-Chief and executive power); Robert F. Turner, War and the
Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War
and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 910 (1994) (noting that declarations are unnecessary
to defend the nation from foreign aggression or to repel attack). Some, however, dispute the
President’s ability to act without a congressional declaration in emergency situations. One
commentator went so far as to conclude, “[t]he power of initiating all hostilities belongs to the
policymaking branch, the Congress.” Francis D. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power:
A Critique, 60 CAL. L. REV. 623, 627 (1972). In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), Justice Jackson appeared to overly restrict Presidential power in national
emergencies when he stated:
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to
meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although it is
something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the
pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready
pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers
would tend to kindle emergencies. Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety may require it, they
made no express provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis. I do
not think we rightfully may so amend their work, and, if we could, I am not convinced it
would be wise to do so . . . .
Id. at 649-50 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public safety may require it.”). However, Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides:
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. That
text provides specific text-based support for the President to act militarily to protect the United
States and its form of government in emergency situations. See Sidak, supra note 143, at 53. As
Justice Clark stated: “[T]he Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority in times
of grave and imperative national emergency . . . . As [President] Lincoln aptly said, ‘[is] it
possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?’” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,
343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to A.G.
Hodges (April 4, 1864), reprinted in 10 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 66 (Nicolay
& Hay ed., 1894)). To limit Presidential over-stepping in confronting a sudden attack, the grant
of power to repel sudden attacks on the United States is not to be construed as a presidential
power to repel an attack by a foreign nation against another foreign nation. Berger, supra note
166, at 51, 65 (citing EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 275, 277 (3d ed.
1948)); Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1343 (citing Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 699-701 (1972) (determining that
the President can initiate a response to a sudden attack against the United States, but cannot
initiate force abroad during crises)).
163. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1338 (quoting 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148
(G. Hunt ed., 1906)).
164. Turner, supra note 162, at 905 (citing ELY, supra note 154, at 5).
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In the exercise of its power, however, Congress need not “declare a total
war against one or more nations, contemplating effective occupation of their
territory and capitulation by their governments.”165 “Rather, the [Constitution]
contemplates congressional . . . declaration of [a] limited war with specifically
designated objectives [that] the President may . . . pursue through the [armed
forces] once [Congress articulates] that specific declaration and circumscribed
objective.”166 Thus, all wars, regardless of their size, and whether or not
Congress formally declared them, have to be legislatively authorized.167
“[T]he determination as to whether circumstances . . . make it necessary and
appropriate to engage in war, however limited in scope or objectives, resides
solely in Congress subject to no delegation.”168 Therefore, “Congress shall
decide whether or not the nation is ready to accept the consequences of
committing itself to war.”169 Essentially, we must follow what the Framers
wrote in the Constitution and allow Congress to control whether or not the
nation goes to war.170
Congress, consequently, determines when peacetime ends and wartime
commences in a Third Amendment context. Patrick O. Gudridge followed the
implications of Ely’s view, stating:
[P]residential use of military force requires a prior congressional declaration of
war only if, along with the use of force, the President means to alter the
ordinary legal rights of American citizens or other persons who come within
the protection of the . . . Constitution. Thus, . . . a presidential military effort
accompanied by relocation of United States residents to internment camps, or
by a regime of press censorship, would presuppose a declaration of war—or
rather, in the absence of such a declaration, these accompaniments might well
be unconstitutional.171

In other words, “a declaration of war [is] a legislative act[ion] marking a shift
in governing law.”172 “The words ‘declare war’ are an elision of a longer
phrase—declare that a state of war exists between the United States and
another named state.”173 Only a declaration of war alters the legal status of the
165. Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 17.
166. Id.
167. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 82 (citing ELY, supra note 154, at 3).
168. Van Alystyne, supra note 155, at 18. Congress cannot shift the determination to embark
upon war to the President by treaty because the House of Representatives does not consent to
treaties, thus, the lower house of Congress would be excluded from the decision-making process.
Id. at 22.
169. J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1425
(1992) [hereinafter Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens].
170. Charles Bennett et al., The President’s Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus
Congress’ War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 29 (1988).
171. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 81.
172. Id. at 99.
173. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 689.
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nation. Consequently, anything short of a declaration of war cannot constitute
a shift from peacetime to wartime status under the Third Amendment.
The argument against a declaration of war serving as an authorization for
the President to act as Commander-in-Chief is an incorrect textual
interpretation. Some base their argument on historical interpretation. For
example, John C. Yoo concludes that “[i]nterpreting ‘declare’ war to mean
‘authorize’ or ‘commence’ is [an inappropriate] Twentieth-Century
construct[ion of the Declare War Clause that is] inconsistent with the
He contends
Eighteenth-Century understanding of the [clause].”174
international scholars of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries agreed that
a declaration of war was unnecessary to begin or to wage a war.175
Accordingly, he believes “[i]t was clearly understood in the eighteenth century
that a ‘declared’ war was only the ultimate state in a gradually ascending scale
of hostilities possible between nations.”176
However, many sources contradict Yoo’s vision. James Madison, a
contemporary of the Eighteenth Century, provided a different intellectual
vision behind declaring war. He stated: “Is the power of declaring war
necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be
superfluous therefore to enter into a proof of the affirmative.”177 Moreover,
Alexander Hamilton described the President’s war powers as “nothing more
than the supreme command and direction of the [armed] forces.”178 Hamilton
noted the power of declaring war appertained to the legislature, not the
President.179 Ely also noted authority exists supporting “the proposition that
‘declare war’ and ‘commence war’ were ‘synonymous’ well before the end of
the eighteenth century.”180 In fact, many scholars from the 1500s to the 1700s
argued that a declaration of war was unnecessary for defensive actions when a
nation is attacked, but generally necessary before a nation undertook offensive
military action.181 Around 1800 there was (and there still is) a difference
between the United States defending itself from an invasion or a formal
declaration of war from another nation and it going to war with a nation at
174. John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 204 (1996).
175. Id. at 206. See also Bennett et al., supra note 170, at 31 (concluding the United States
can engage in military operations without a formal declaration of war).
176. Yoo, supra note 174, at 205.
177. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
179. Id. See also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 497 n.7
(5th ed. 1984) (quoting Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to William Herndon, in 10
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN I 111-12 (Nicolay & Hay ed., 1894) (concluding the
Constitution left war-making authority with Congress because no one person should hold the
power of bringing war upon the nation)).
180. Gudridge, supra note 153, at 82 (quoting ELY, supra note 154, at 142 n.21).
181. Turner, supra note 162, at 906-10.
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peace.182 Thus, there is a dispute concerning whether or not a declaration of
war was unnecessary and did not serve as legislative authorization for the
President. It cannot be said, then, that it was clearly understood in the colonial
era that declare did not mean authorize for war powers purposes.
Other commentators have listed various potential reasons for Presidential
war-making power. One reason is that Congress may only control the
President’s discretion to use military force abroad by reducing defense funds or
impeaching him.183 Another is that Presidential power to make war abroad
need not be based on Commander-in-Chief power, but rather on his executive
power under Article II of the Constitution.184
Another view supporting presidential war-making inappropriately blurs the
line between legislative and executive powers. In order to dismiss the textual
command that Congress must authorize war, this view is forced to characterize
congressional war authorization as a rigid and mechanical “either/or” logic.185
Some judicial decisions conjured up intriguing buzz words and phrases that
describe constitutional war powers provisions as not providing fields of “black
and white,”186 which leads to the infamous “zone of twilight”187 wherein both
the President and Congress may act. Outside of the President’s ability to
unilaterally act to defend the nation from an attack,188 a straightforward,
reasonable interpretation of the Constitution shows Congress authorizes war
and the President commands the military. This interpretation might not foster
unique phrases for legal wordsmiths, but it is an accurate constitutional
interpretation.
The debate regarding what declare means in relation to Presidential warmaking power is not the specific issue here. Instead, this article focuses on
what can change the legal status of the nation from peacetime to wartime under
the Third Amendment, which is a question with a more universally accepted
answer. Congress has the exclusive province to change the nation from a
182. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 626 (quoting United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
183. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1334 n.25 (1984) (citing J. Terry Emerson, The War
Powers Resolution Tested: The President’s Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 187, 214-15 (1975)). For a thorough review of how congressional appropriation power for
national defense measures affects the President’s military capabilities, see Peter Raven-Hansen
and William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commandeer in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV.
833 (1994).
184. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1330. See also id. at 1336 (citing Note, Congress, the
President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (1968)).
185. Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 25 (1970).
186. Doe v. Bush, 322 F.3d 109, 110 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
187. Id. at 110 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
188. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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“state of peace into a state of war.”189 While Yoo concluded that Congress
does not authorize war through a declaration of war, he nevertheless
determined that historically a declaration of war notifies citizens of war,
thereby altering their legal rights and status.190 He argued that historically a
declaration performs an important function in distinguishing between limited
hostilities and an all-out conflict or formal war.191 Even though he believes
that declaration does not authorize war, he recognized that declaring war deals
with establishing “the formal, legal relationship between two nations.”192 He
found the following early support for this conclusion from Chancellor Kent:
[S]ome formal public act . . . should announce to the people at home, their new
relations and duties growing out of a state of war, and which should equally
apprize neutral nations of the fact, to enable them to conform their conduct to
the rights belonging to the new state of things . . . Such an official act operates
from its date to legalize all hostile acts, in like manner as a treaty of peace
operates from its date to annul them.193

Therefore, a declaration of war announces Congress’s “judgment that a legal
state of war exists.”194 Specifically, Yoo provided an apt summary of how a
declaration of war serves as the trigger to alter the nation’s legal status from
peacetime to wartime. He stated:
[The] core function of a declaration of war could be thought to “authorize” war
by justifying federal wartime policies. Because the declaration of war has a
primary domestic effect of notifying the citizens of their new rights and
obligations, it grants the government a different standard of conduct in relation
to those rights and duties. Thus, a declaration of war would permit the
government to treat its citizens in a way that restricted peacetime liberties in
favor of a more effective war effort. The Fifth Amendment . . . generally
guarantees the right to an indictment or presentment by grand jury for capital
crimes, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . . Thus, a
declaration of war had a domestic function, which permitted new government
actions in light of the changed legal status of its citizens. A declaration of war
did not grant permission for executive action abroad, as we would expect of an
“authorization” of war, but only set the stage for the exercise of domestic
wartime powers, primarily by Congress.195

189. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 626 (quoting United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230
(C.C.D. N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342)).
190. Yoo, supra note 174, at 207.
191. Id. at 205.
192. Id. at 245.
193. Id. at 244-45 (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 53-54 (2d.
ed. 1832)).
194. Id. at 246.
195. Yoo, supra note 174, at 245-46 (internal citations omitted).
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Applying Yoo’s analysis, a declaration of war would serve a domestic
function of notifying the nation that wartime formally exists, thereby alerting
the citizenry that the President has increased domestic powers that might
infringe upon civil rights. Thus, the declaration establishes a legal foundation
for the people, through their elected representatives, to debate the manner in
which the compelled quartering of soldiers could take place.
More specifically, in a Third Amendment context this means that
peacetime exists until war is declared. Then, and only then, can wartime exist
under the Third Amendment. A declaration of war signifies to the citizenry
that the legal status of peacetime has formally changed to wartime.
Accordingly, compelled quartering of soldiers may only occur after a
congressional declaration of war, even though a conflict meeting the ordinary
meaning of war might exist before the declaration.
This parallels the Fifth Amendment’s peacetime and wartime measures.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees an indictment or presentment by a grand jury
for capital crimes in peacetime.196 After a congressional declaration of war,
however, the legal status of affairs switches to wartime and the right to
indictment and presentment ceases.197 Thus, under the Third Amendment,
only a congressional declaration of war would switch the legal status of the
nation to wartime and allow for the compelled quartering of soldiers.
Following this methodology will provide a clear and consistent standard to
determine when constitutional peacetime protections convert to wartime status
under the Third and Fifth Amendments, thus providing a unified constitutional
framework.
Without a formal declaration of war, how do the people know when
wartime starts? Allowing for the compelled quartering of soldiers without a
declaration could raise due process concerns. Without a declaration, how do
the people receive notice of a change in the national legal status of affairs from
peacetime to wartime? The answer is that Congress starts the wartime clock
with a declaration of war and gives the people notice of the legal change in
status through a declaration of war.
This procedure satisfies the Third Amendment’s law-making requirement
for the compelled quartering of soldiers. Recall that compelled quartering of
soldiers in wartime is not always constitutionally acceptable—the compelled
quartering must occur through a manner prescribed by law.198 In a federal
sense,199 Congress would have to pass law or laws regulating the quartering of
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
197. Id.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
199. The Third Amendment originally only applied to the federal government. See generally
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the ‘Jurisprudence of Original Intention’, 74
GEO. L.J. 1719, 1730 (1986); Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the
Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64
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soldiers.200 Therefore, congressional action is not only contemplated, but
required by the amendment. Accordingly, the amendment’s text sanctions
formal congressional action and, to allow for compelled quartering during
wartime, mandates it. Other congressional action, such as a declaration of war,
would likewise be appropriate under the amendment. Congressional action, in
the form of a declaration of war, to trigger wartime status, squares with the
amendment’s text. Subsequent lawmaking prescribing the manner in which
soldiers could be quartered would necessarily follow the declaration of war.
Before the manner in which soldiers could be quartered in wartime is
prescribed, Congress would have to declare war to notify the citizenry that
wartime supplanted peacetime. After that, Congress could pass legislation
prescribing the manner in which the quartering may take place.
In sum, a formal declaration of war vests the President with extraordinary
powers in wartime.201 Regardless of whether one believes war can exist
without a declaration,202 or only through a declaration,203 there appears to be
less debate that peacetime status cannot convert to wartime status without a
formal declaration of war, thereby triggering certain statutes and constitutional
provisions that vest the President with authority not available in peacetime.204

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 245 (1988); Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An Interpretive Theory of the
Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 774 (1994). The amendment now applies against the states
as a fundamental right through the judicially created substantive due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 960-61 (2d Cir. 1982). This
author believes that the Third Amendment, and all other provisions of the Bill of Rights, apply
against the states as well, but through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Schmidt, supra note 24, at 177-78. Most states protect their citizens from the
compelled quartering of soldiers as well. See infra note 418.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Id.
201. See generally Sidak, supra note 143, at 93; Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra
note 169, at 1426.
202. See Yoo, supra note 174, at 206.
203. See generally Sidak, supra note 143, at 93; Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra
note 169, at 1426.
204. See Sidak, supra note 143, at 69-70; Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra note
169, at 1425-27; Yoo, supra note 174, at 207, 245-46. President George W. Bush’s authorization
for the CIA to kill terrorists defines al Quaeda operatives as “enemy combatants” and “legitimate
targets for lethal force.” Risen & Johnston, supra note 101. President Ford ordered a ban on
assassinations, which many feel applies to foreign leaders and civilians, although leaders acting as
military officials in a war (such as Saddam Hussein in the war against Iraq) might be a legitimate
target in a war. Id. This leads to the inevitable complication of a politically declared but legally
undeclared war that “blur[s] the distinction between enemy combatants and other nonstate
actors.” Id. (quoting Harold Hongju Koh). This leads to two conclusions. First, the War on
Terrorism is not a declared war, but a politically declared war that cannot alter peacetime status to
wartime status. Second, the designation of enemy combatants does not create a wartime state of
affairs, but merely blurs the water in certain respects.
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The War Powers Resolution

While the Declare War Clause is a constitutional provision designating
congressional power, The War Powers Resolution,205 a federal statute,
provides another textual source shedding light on what is war. It provides:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.206

There has been a longstanding debate about the statute’s meaning and its
constitutional legitimacy.207 Unfortunately, the federal Executive and
Legislative Branches cannot agree on a definition that is essential and
elemental to the wise governance of the nation in times of crisis.208
The statute establishes that a congressional declaration of war is not the
only means available to authorize the President to mobilize the armed forces.
The statute allows for troop deployment either through a declaration of war, a
statutory authorization or a national emergency.209 Thus, Congress, by passing
the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto,210 indirectly
concluded that a declaration of war is not the only way in which the President
could mobilize the armed forces. Thus, any congressional authorization of
troop deployment or force does not constitute a declaration of war or a wartime
state, as two other mechanisms exist to authorize the use of such force.
Obviously, if Congress chose statutory authorization, as opposed to declaring
war, then its authorization for military action would fall below a formal
declaration of war. Consequently, because war was not authorized in that
instance, wartime could not exist. Finally, if the President acted unilaterally in
a national emergency, without congressional action, that could not constitute
wartime as the President cannot declare war.
The statute provides a logical, constitutional allocation of war powers. A
reasonable interpretation of the statute shows that a distinction exists between a
declared war and specific statutory authorization for the President to mobilize
the armed forces. The statute divides those congressional powers into separate
categories. As such, specific statutory authorization for military action, while
based on Congress’s power to authorize military action, must be viewed as
being subsidiary to a formal declaration of war and cannot constitute a wartime
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
Id. at § 1541(c).
See Sidak, supra note 143, at 32-35.
Id.
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2000).
MAY & IDES, supra note 162, at 264.
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state of affairs. Some criticized the resolution because, in their view, it would
prevent the President from responding to attacks.211 However, Section 1541(c)
allows the President to act unilaterally in an emergency created by an attack
against the United States.212 This follows Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution’s mandate that the United States protect individual states from
invasion.213
The War Powers Resolution is a constitutionally accurate summary and
application of war powers, thus, it is a perfectly valid act of Congress.214
Congress does not have to move to assert authority in war powers.215 The
Declare War Clause allocates Congress alone with the authority to declare war.
Therefore, Congress’s passage of the War Powers Resolution is not a
circuitous, constitutionally suspect maneuver.216 Instead, it is a proper
statutory provision based on Congress’s ability to enact laws necessary and
proper to carry into execution its own enumerated powers and all other powers
vested in the United States government or any officer or department thereof.217
A congressional declaration of war, as the statute provides, would
constitute a conversion from peacetime to wartime and sanction the President
to declare a war. However, that authorization does not mean that the
declaration serves only as an authorization or that a declaration is the only way
to effectuate an authorization of military force. The statute, by allowing for
statutory authorization or a national emergency to authorize military action
proves that a declaration is not the only manner in which Congress can
authorize the President to conduct military affairs short of war.218
211. Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1334 (citing Donald E. King & Arthur B. Leavens, Curbing
the Dog of War: The War Powers Resolution, 18 HARV. INT’L L.J. 55, 80-81 (1977)). See also
W. Taylor Reveley III, The Power of War, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF
FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY BY A PANEL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 116-17 (Francis Wilcox & Richard Frank eds., 1976); Joseph B. Kelly, Proposed
Legislation Curbing the War Powers of the President, 76 DICK. L. REV. 411, 415-16 (1972)
(arguing that the War Powers Resolution is likely unconstitutional because it did not recognize
the President’s emergency power to repel attacks on foreign allies).
212. 50 U.S.C § 1541(c) (2000).
213. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
214. See Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 26. Similarly, the President cannot use the army
against the civilian population, except under the most extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 27; 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
215. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 24.
216. But see id.
217. See id. at 26 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). See also Alexander M. Bickel,
Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 131, 140 (1971)
(determining Congress, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, can do what is necessary and
proper in carrying out functions conferred upon it; thus, if it is necessary to carry out the declare
war power by taking measures short of a declaration of war, Congress may do so).
218. Another federal statute, 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000), authorizes the President to apprehend,
restrain, secure, and remove persons fourteen years and older of an enemy nation when there is a
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In the end, a bedrock principle of our Constitution is that “the nation
cannot be . . . constitutionally committed to a state of war without the positive
approval of both houses of Congress.”219 As such, a formal declaration must
occur for wartime to be present in a reasonable, not strict, interpretation of the
Third Amendment’s text.220 When a declaration occurs, the nation’s legal
status changes from peacetime to wartime under the Third Amendment.
2.

Historical Understanding of “War”

Throughout history, Congress’s war-making power has not prevented
Presidents from sending the nation’s armed forces into hostilities or situations
where hostilities were imminent without Congress’s approval.221 “The United
States has declared war only five times: during the War of 1812, the MexicanAmerican War of 1848, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and World Wars I
(1914) and II (1941).”222 Obviously, those conflicts are considered a war and
in a Third Amendment context they would constitute a “time of War” under
the amendment. However, the United States has committed military forces
into hostilities abroad at least 125 times since the Constitution’s ratification.223
Early American history shows Congress can declare war, thereby
authorizing a formal war or a wartime state of affairs, or it can authorize a
limited war that does not rise to the level of a formal war. Either way,
Congress controls which status exists—a system that Presidents Adams and
Jefferson subscribed to in the nation’s beginning.224
“declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion
or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United
States.” Id. Because this statute only comes into effect pursuant to a declared war or defense of
an attack, it is not illustrative of the United States’ ability to engage in an offensive war absent a
congressional declaration of such.
219. Berger, supra note 166, at 67 n.242 (quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 66 (1951)).
220. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 23.
221. Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War
Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 79 (1984).
222. Yoo, supra note 174, at 177.
223. Id. See also Berger, supra note 166, at 58 (citing Department of State, Office of the
Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, reprinted in
75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1966) (stating there were at least one hundred twenty-five instances in
which the President ordered the military to take action or maintain positions abroad without
obtaining congressional authorization, starting with the quasi-war with France from 1798-1800);
Vance, supra note 221, at 79-80 (citing J. Terry Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L.
REV. 53, 88-110, 367-68 (1972)) (stating there were “199 United States military engagements
overseas between 1798 and 1972 that occurred without a declaration of war”); Comment,
America in Vietnam: A Model for the Exercise of the War Powers, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. 253, 258
(1989) (citing FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE
WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN HISTORY AND LAW 142-43 (1986)).
224. See infra notes 423-36 and accompanying text.
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The Prize Cases225 determined that a war existed without a declaration
during the Civil War.226 However, the Court noted that a civil war could never
be declared, that Congress alone can declare war and that Congress and
President Lincoln essentially followed constitutional war powers when
Congress authorized and funded military action and President Lincoln
defended the nation and led the armed forces.227 The Prize Cases’ progeny
discussed insurance policies of deceased soldiers whose beneficiaries’ claimed
the deceased passed away during a war under the policy.228 Therefore, those
cases deal with disputes concerning the ordinary meaning of war, not its legal
meaning. Accordingly, because they do not concern a legal, constitutional
issue, they are irrelevant when determining whether peacetime or wartime
exists under the Third Amendment.
Two Supreme Court cases from the mid-Twentieth Century promote the
correct legal interpretation of war. The Court established that Congress can
declare peacetime in one instance and not in another, and each instance must
be analyzed separately.229 Furthermore, the Court concluded the President
could not act unilaterally to seize steel plants without Congress authorizing
such a wartime measure.230
Finally, modern challenges to the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and
the war against Iraq affirm Congress’s role as authorizing war and the
President’s role as executing such wars.231 These challenges affirm that the
historical understanding of war is that Congress declares war or wartime, and
the President can only act outside of defensive military measures after such a
declaration. Therefore, the President can only order the compelled quartering
of soldiers after a congressional declaration of war and Congress prescribes a
manner for their quartering.
a)

Early Conflicts and the Construction of War Powers

The quasi-war with France from 1798-1800 gave an early indication of
what constituted wartime. In the late Eighteenth Century, the French seized
American vessels.232 Congress did not issue a formal declaration of war, but
authorized reprisals at sea against French vessels.233 Specifically, Congress
stated:
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
§ 1, 1

67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
Id. at 668.
Id. at 667-68.
See infra notes 278-291 and accompanying text.
Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1959).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952).
See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text.
Sidak, supra note 143, at 80.
Id. at 56 (citing Act of July 9, 1978, ch. 68, § 1, 1 Stat. 578; Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 60,
Stat. 578. See also ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND
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[T]he President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby authorized to
instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels which are, or which shall
be employed in the service of the United States, to subdue, seize and take any
armed French vessel, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of
the United States, or elsewhere, on the high seas . . . .234

The Supreme Court determined the quasi-war with France was a limited,
undeclared war.235 The United States’ actions of raising an army, stopping
intercourse with France, dissolving a treaty with France, building ships for war
and authorizing private ships to fight French ships showed “the degree of
hostility meant to be carried on, was sufficiently described without declaring
war.”236 However, the Court established a distinction between general wars
and limited wars, wherein general wars are akin to congressional declarations
of war and limited wars involve military action short of a declaration.237
The Court viewed a declared war as “solemn, and . . . of the perfect kind[]
because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation . . . and all the
rights and consequences of war attach to [the] condition.”238 However, the
Court stated that “hostilities may subsist between two nations[,] more confined
in its nature and extent.”239 The Court’s reference to Congress’s ability to
designate the level of war showed that “Congress is empowered to declare a
general war, or [it] may wage a limited war [that is] limited in place, in objects,
[and] in time.240 That power, however, remains with Congress—President
Adams undertook “absolutely no independent action” during the quasi-war
with France.241
The Court did not examine whether a limited war equated to a “time of
War” as indicated in the Third Amendment (obviously, a declared war means a
time of war is present in a Third Amendment context), as no quartering issue
was at hand. However, the Court thoroughly discussed the different types of

DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801 (1966); JAMES ROGERS,
WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS, NINE WARS AND A HUNDRED MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1789-1945, at 45-46
(1945); Simeon E. Baldwin, The Share of the President of the United States in a Declaration of
War, 12 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1918).
234. Van Alstyne, supra note 155, at 18 (quoting Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, § 1, 1 Stat. 578).
235. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800). Currently, a limited war is sometimes
referred to as a low-intensity conflict (LIC). See Uyeda, supra note 141, at 794-95.
236. Bas, 4 U.S. at 41.
237. Id. at 43.
238. Id. at 40.
239. Id. (emphasis added). See also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801)
(concluding that Congress may authorize a limited, undeclared war).
240. Bas, 4 U.S. at 43.
241. Berger, supra note 166, at 58 n.191.
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military conflicts Congress may authorize and their legal ramifications.242 Yoo
described:
[T]he Court held that Congress had the sole power to decide on the legal
nature of hostilities: whether they would be “general” or “partial,” “public” or
“private,” “solemn” and “imperfect” or “limited” and “imperfect.”. . .”If a
general war is declared, its extent and operations are only restricted and
regulated by the jus belli, forming a part of the law of nations; but if a partial
war is waged, its extent and operation depend on our municipal laws.”243

Shortly after Bas Chief Justice Marshall affirmed its holding.
The whole powers of war being by the [C]onstitution of the United States,
vested in [C]ongress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our
guides in this enquiry . . . . [C]ongress may authorize general hostilities, in
which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or partial hostilities,
in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation,
must be noticed.244

Therefore, if the Constitution vests Congress with the power to initiate a
limited or general war,245 and Congress determines the nature and extent of
hostilities, then must not Congress determine when the legal status of the
nation changes from peacetime to wartime under the Third Amendment?
Congress’s ability to authorize a limited or general war shows the graduated
scale of conflicts it may sanction. If Congress determines that a limited war
exists, its operations and legal ramifications are limited as well. On the other
hand, a general war encompasses the full threshold of wartime operations and
legal ramifications. Thus, only a general or declared war constitutes a change
from peacetime status to wartime status under the Third Amendment. A
limited war only operates to meet the partial or limited nature of the war,
thereby falling short of invoking a full wartime state of affairs. Congress,
sanctioned with war-making power, may make the lone determination if
peacetime or wartime exists under the Third Amendment. Only Congress’s
formal declaration of war changes the legal status of the nation from peacetime
to wartime under the Third Amendment.
Almost immediately after the quasi-war with France, Tripoli declared war
against the United States in 1801.246 Tripoli attacked an American vessel,

242. Yoo, supra note 174, at 290-94.
243. Id. at 294 (quoting Bas, 4 U.S. at 43) (emphasis added)). See also Little v. Barreme, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (concluding that Presidential authority in an undeclared war is limited
to acts Congress authorizes).
244. Talbot, 5 U.S. at 28. The distinction between Congress’s ability to sanction formal,
general war and limited war extended at least until 1886. See William Gray v. United States, 21
Ct. Cl. 340 (1886).
245. Wormuth, supra note 162, at 690.
246. Berger, supra note 166, at 61.
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which defended itself, and released the attacker.247
summarized the event as follows:

President Jefferson

Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go
beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from committing further
hostilities, was liberated with its crew. The Legislature will doubtless consider
whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our force on
an equal footing with that of its adversaries.248

Jefferson’s statement shows that the United States may defend itself
without Congressional authorization and that only Congress can authorize
military action beyond defense from attack. Therefore, he essentially asked
Congress to determine whether further offensive military action was
appropriate. This humble presidential respect for the Constitution and
Congress might not be commonplace today, but it shows offensive war-making
authority lies with Congress alone. Thus, Congress alone has the power to
determine when the United States enters wartime, thereby supplanting
peacetime under the Third Amendment.
Jefferson’s deference to Congress to determine when wartime existed
continued. In 1805, Spain considered action against the United States
concerning Louisiana’s boundaries.249 Jefferson more directly addressed the
legal status of the nation. “Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally
invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have
thought it my duty to await their authority for using force.”250 Once again,
early American history shows Congress alone has the power to alter the United
States’ legal status from peacetime to wartime. If that is the case in a use of
force construct, it must likewise be the case in a Third Amendment context.
Only a congressional declaration of war switches the peacetime status of the
nation to wartime.
b)

The Prize Cases

In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court concluded the President could
institute a blockade of Confederate ports during the Civil War, and that the
right of a prize through capture on the sea of Confederate property was also
appropriate because it was considered enemy property.251 However, the Court
instructed that Congress did not have to declare war for the Civil War to
literally be considered a war because “[a] civil war is never solemnly declared;
it becomes such by its accidents—the number, power, and organization of the

247. Id.
248. 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at
327 (James D. Richardson ed., 1900) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
249. Berger, supra, note 166, at 62.
250. MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 248, at 389.
251. The Prize Cases (The Amy Warwick), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671, 675 (1862).
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persons who originate and carry it on.”252 While Congress alone can declare
war, the Court stated “[i]t cannot declare war against a State, or any number of
States, by virtue of any clause in the Constitution.”253 Furthering this point,
the Court concluded:
When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain
portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their
allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their
former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the
contest a war.
....
This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popular
commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insurrections.
However long may have been its previous conception, it nevertheless sprung
forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of war.
The President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him
or them could change the fact.
....
They cannot ask a Court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence of
a war, which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in
the history of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the Government and
paralyze its power by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms.254

Thus, the Court recognized the unique and constitutionally unchartered setting
of a civil war wherein a part of the nation engages in war with the
Government. As Congress cannot declare war against an individual state or
states, a civil war cannot be a declared war. This does not conflict with the
Court’s holding that the United States, essentially, was at war or in wartime. A
civil war appears to be the lone historical exception allowing a wartime state of
affairs without a declaration of war.
Furthermore, the Court correctly noted that even in an unprecedented and
constitutionally unchartered setting, the President and Congress still acted in
accordance with war powers principles. The Court correctly concluded that
when a foreign nation initiates a war by invasion, the President is bound to
resist force with force.255 In other words, the President does not initiate war

252. Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 668.
254. Id. at 666-67, 668-69, 669-70 (emphasis in original). See also Graham T. Allison,
Making War: The President and Congress, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., at 86, 91 (Summer
1976) (noting that the Civil War met the ordinary meaning of war).
255. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668.
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but is bound to accept the challenge.256 In considering President Lincoln’s
acts, we must also consider that “they were triggered by a ‘sudden attack’ on
American soil, the firing upon Fort Sumter, and this [occurred] when Congress
was not in session.”257 Thus, Lincoln’s actions fit within his duty to protect the
republican form of government and the states from invasion under the
Constitution.258 Accordingly, Lincoln’s domestic defense actions do not create
precedent for subsequent presidential resistance to a sudden attack on a foreign
country without congressional authorization.259 In fact, the “[N]ineteenth
Century . . . offers no example of a President who plunged the nation into war
in order to repel an attack on some foreign nation.”260
The Court also addressed whether Congress technically declared war or
whether other congressional action constituted sufficient legislative sanction of
the President’s conduct during the war. The Court stated:
If it were necessary to the technical existence of a war, that it should have a
legislative sanction, we find it in almost every act passed at the extraordinary
session of the Legislature of 1861, which was wholly employed in enacting
laws to enable the Government to prosecute the war with vigor and
efficiency.261

The Court stated, “By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to
declare a national or foreign war.”262 Moreover, the Court concluded:
[The President] has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a
foreign nation or a domestic [s]tate. But by the Acts of Congress of February
28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to . . . use . . . military . . .
forces . . . in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection
against the government of a [s]tate or of the United States.263

Consequently, the Court affirmed that Congress authorizes war, and the
President only executes military operations absent the defense of a sudden
attack on the United States where the President can act unilaterally.264
Therefore, the careful constitutional balance of war powers wherein Congress

256. Id.
257. Berger, supra note 166, at 64 (citing CORWIN, supra note 162, at 277).
258. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
259. Berger, supra note 160, at 65 (citing CORWIN, supra note 162, at 279-80). See also
Berger, supra note 160, at 51 (noting that a grant of power to “repel suddent attacks” is not a
license to repel and attack on Korea); Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1343 (citing Lofgren, supra
note 162, at 699-701).
260. Berger, supra note 160, at 65 (citing Albert H. Putney, Executive Assumption of the War
Making Power, 7 NAT’L U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1927); Note, Congress, the President, and the Power
to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968)).
261. The Prize Cases (The Amy Warwick), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
262. Id. at 668.
263. Id.
264. See id. at 691.
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determines the existence of war, with the President only executing it absent an
emergency situation, was not only followed in principle during the Civil War,
but reaffirmed by the Court. If Congress, the President and the Supreme Court
affirmed this paradigm of war powers, even in the most extreme scenario, we
must also follow it today.
While President Lincoln, in many respects, followed war powers, in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Douglas appropriately
rejected President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
during the Civil War.265 “[T]he Constitution implies that the writ of habeas
corpus may be suspended in certain circumstances but does not say by
whom[;] President Lincoln asserted . . . it as an executive function.”266 In
1862, Lincoln unilaterally suspended habeas corpus, which led to the arrest of
a Maryland Secessionist, John Merryman.267 Chief Justice Taney of the United
States Supreme Court “issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the military
to bring Merryman before him,” which the military refused to follow.268 Then,
Justice Taney “ruled [Lincoln’s] suspension of habeas corpus unconstitutional
because the writ could not be suspended without an Act of Congress.”269
Lincoln ignored the ruling.270 Consequently, Congress ratified his action in
1863.271 Only after the war was habeas corpus fully restored when the
Supreme Court ruled that “military trials in areas where the civil courts were
capable of functioning were illegal.”272
While the power to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus is not explicitly
given to Congress, its placement in Article I, wherein Congress’s other powers
are found, leads to the inference that it is within Congress’s authority.
Moreover, current precedent is clear that only Congress can suspend habeas
corpus.273 On the other hand, the Declare War Clause is extremely clear: “The
Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.”274 Accordingly, Congress
alone has the power to determine when wartime exists.
265. 343 U.S. 579, 632 n.1 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487)).
266. Id. at 637 n.3 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. “The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Id.
267. American Patriot Network, Did President Lincoln Suspend the U.S. Constitution?,
available at http://www.civil-liberties.com/pages/did_lincoln.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 632 n.1 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
12 Stat 755).
272. See American Patriot Network, supra note 267; Ex parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
121-22 (1866).
273. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148-49 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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Lincoln’s unconstitutional, unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is distinct from the Third Amendment’s requirements in another way.
The Third Amendment allows wartime quartering only through a manner
prescribed by law.275 Thus, Congress is specifically called upon to pass a law
or laws regulating the compelled quartering. Accordingly, would not Congress
logically be called upon to convert the amendment’s peacetime status to
wartime status? This is further verified by Congress’s power to declare war.276
All textual signs point to Congress, not the President, as having power to
effectuate wartime status under the Third Amendment.
In a Third Amendment context, formal text-based lawmaking trumps
principled government action, which is text-based but not text-compliant.
Allowing principles and inferences to guide when peacetime converts to
wartime subjects the protection to political and judicial whim. Allowing for an
informal notice of a change from peacetime to wartime contradicts the Third
Amendment’s formalistic, law-making requirements. The amendment only
allows for wartime compelled quartering through a manner prescribed by
law.277 Therefore, a formal law must be present, even in wartime, for
compelled quartering to take place. How then, could an extremely informal
designation of war, such as congressional statutory authorization through the
War Powers Resolution or a unilateral Presidential offensive characterized as
war, trigger the crucial change from peacetime to wartime? If that were the
case, then the amendment would allow an informal, implied or inference-based
change from peacetime to wartime, but the manner to act upon the wartime
authority would still have to be a formal law. This type of constitutional
hopscotch from informal change from peacetime to wartime, and formal
prescription of how quartering then takes place, would create an illogical and
inconsistent procedural and substantive application of the Third Amendment.
Surely, that cannot be what the amendment commands.
c)

The Meaning of “War” Through Insurance Policies

Many courts came to opposite conclusions concerning whether the United
States was at war under the insurance policy terms of soldiers killed in
different military-oriented situations. The division occurred because of
different interpretations of the meaning of war within the policies. A number
of cases held “that an armed conflict is not a war, in the legal or constitutional
sense, in the absence of a [congressional] declaration of war.”278 These cases

275. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
277. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
278. Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co, 284 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Wash. 1955); Beley v. Pa. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. 1953); Harding v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 221 (Pa.
1953) (discussing a similar issue as in Beley). See also Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass’n, 145
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extend Congress’s authority to determine when war exists beyond
constitutional issues and into contractual interpretations of private insurance
policies.279 In construing similar clauses that involve “private matters[]
unaffected by a public interest,” other courts concluded that “courts are free to
take judicial notice of the existence of a war although no formal declaration of
war has [occurred].”280 In the end, “[t]he answer [to these disputes] is to be
found [in] the scope and meaning of the word ‘war.’”281 Essentially, should
war be construed in its legal or ordinary sense?282
Obviously, those courts concluding a war can only exist through a
congressional declaration would likely support a view that wartime can only
exist through a congressional declaration of war. Accordingly, applying those
cases here would mean only a congressional declaration of war could alter the
peacetime status of the United States to wartime under the Third Amendment.
Furthermore, those cases holding that under an insurance policy, war can
be said to exist absent a congressional declaration, also support the view that
only Congress can determine when war formally exists. For example, in New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion,283 the court followed insurance and contract law
principles in determining that a state of war existed under a deceased’s
insurance policy when the deceased was killed at Pearl Harbor even though
Congress did not declare war until the day after Pearl Harbor. The court
admitted that “a state of war is a political question, to be determined by the
political department of our Government.”284 It follows that Congress
determines when wartime exists. In construing the insurance contract, the
court determined that if the parties intended war “to mean a state of war . . .
commenced only [through] a formal [congressional] declaration,” then that

P.2d 227, 230 (Idaho 1944); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 25 S.E.2d 475, 477 (S.C. 1943);
Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 57 F. Supp. 620, 621 (W.D. La. 1944).
279. See generally Christensen, 284 P.2d 287.
280. Id. at 289 (citing W. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1953)
(concluding that an insured killed in Alaska during the Korean War was killed at war); Langlas v.
Iowa Life Ins. Co., 63 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1954) (concluding that an insured killed in the
Korean War was killed at war); Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 98 A.2d 134, 138 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1953) (concluding that an insured killed in the Korean War was killed at war);
Weissman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420, 425 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (concluding that an
insured killed in the Korean War was killed at war); Gagliormella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 122 F.
Supp. 246, 249-50 (D. Mass. 1954) (concluding that an insured killed in the Korean War was
killed at war)). See also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260, 265 (10th Cir. 1946)
(concluding that an insured killed at Pearl Harbor was killed at war); Hamilton v. McClaughry,
136 F. 445, 451 (C.C.D. Kan. 1905) (concluding that an insured killed in the Boxer Rebellion in
China was killed at war).
281. Christensen, 284 P.2d at 288.
282. Id.
283. 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946).
284. Id. at 262.
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meaning would have applied.285 However, the court found that the parties did
not “use the word war in the technical sense of a formally declared war.”286
Thus, the court followed the maxim that “words used in insurance contracts . . .
are to be construed under their plain, ordinary and popular sense, unless it is
evident . . . that the words were intended to have some other special
meaning.”287 This led to the court’s conclusion that the deceased died as a
result of “war or an act incident thereto within the meaning . . . of the insurance
policy.”288
The court affirmed the principles that Congress determines when wartime
formally exists and that the word war has an ordinary and legal meaning. The
court gave deference to the political form of government to determine when
war exists. It recognized that Congress, through the Declare War Clause, has
the power to declare war.289 Thus, it is the Legislative Branch of government
that can switch the United States’ legal status from peacetime to wartime.
Next, the court only concluded war existed because the insurance contract
contemplated the ordinary meaning of war, not its legal meaning.290 If the
parties desired war’s legal meaning to apply, the court would have followed it
and presumably determined that a formal, declared war did not exist until the
day after Pearl Harbor. As such, the court deferred to Congress to address the
legal issue of whether wartime existed and limited its holding to a conclusion
that war existed under the ordinary meaning of war under a private insurance
policy.291
This condition of war, meeting an insurance policy description, is not the
same as that which changes the United States’ legal status from peacetime to
wartime under the Third Amendment. A condition of war could exist under
the word’s ordinary meaning. That does not, however, signify a change in the
legal status of the nation from peacetime to wartime. Recovery under an
insurance policy complies with war’s ordinary meaning within an insurance
policy, as the parties understood it to mean, while not affecting whether
wartime existed in a Third Amendment sense. The determination of whether
war, within its ordinary meaning, existed under an insurance policy is thus
distinct from determining if wartime exists under a constitutional amendment
that protects against compelled quartering of soldiers. As such, those cases
concluding that war exists without a congressional declaration for insurance
policy purposes does not provide any precedential support under the Third

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Bennion, 158 F.2d at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
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Amendment for concluding wartime can exist without a congressional
declaration of war.
d)

Mid-Twentieth Century Interpretation of Legal War Powers

In Lee v. Madigan,292 the issue arose of when World War II ended. The
United States declared war against Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1941.293 The
Court provided the appropriate factual summary of when World War II
concluded. It stated:
The Germans surrendered on May 8, 1945, the Japanese on September 2,
1945 . . . The President on December 31, 1946, proclaimed the cessation of
hostilities, adding that ‘a state of war still exists.’ . . . The war with Germany
terminated October 19, 1951, by a Joint Resolution of Congress and a
Presidential Proclamation. And on April 28, 1952, the formal declaration of
peace and termination of war with Japan was proclaimed by the President.294

In Lee, the Court had to decide if a “time of peace” existed on June 10, 1949,
when a member of the army allegedly engaged in conspiracy to commit
murder.295 Under Article of War 92, if peacetime existed, he could not be tried
by a court-martial.296 The Court determined that the United States was in
peacetime on June 10, 1949, four years after World War II hostilities ceased,
even though Congress had not yet officially declared peacetime.297 The Court
discussed how to evaluate the term “time of peace” in different contexts. The
Court stated:
We deal with a term that must be construed in light of the precise facts of each
case and the impact of the particular statute involved. Congress in drafting
laws may decide that the [n]ation may be ‘at war’ for one purpose, and ‘at
peace’ for another . . . . The problem of judicial interpretation is to determine
whether ‘in the sense of this law’ peace had arrived. Only mischief can result
if those terms are given one meaning regardless of the statutory context.298

Following the Court’s holding, the Third Amendment must be considered in its
context; it must be construed within the circumstances of this article’s
scenario. To do otherwise would be akin to specifically engaging in the danger
the Court warned against—giving the amendment’s terms one meaning
regardless of their context. Instead of a universal interpretation of peacetime,
the Court relied on how civil rights would be impacted by allowing a court-

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

358 U.S. 228 (1959).
Yoo, supra note 174, at 177.
Lee, 358 U.S. at 230 (citations omitted).
Id. at 229.
10 U.S.C. § 1564 (1946).
See Lee, 358 U.S. at 236.
Id. at 230-31 (citation omitted).
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martial to occur for an alleged crime committed four years after hostilities
ceased. The Court provided:
We cannot readily assume that the earlier Congress used ‘in time of peace’ in
Article 92 to deny soldiers or civilians the benefit of jury trials for capital
offenses four years after all hostilities had ceased. To hold otherwise would be
to make substantial rights turn on a fiction. We will not presume that Congress
used the words ‘in time of peace’ in that sense. The meaning attributed to
them is at war with common sense, destructive of civil rights, and unnecessary
for realization of the balanced scheme promulgated by the Articles of War.299

Therefore, under Lee, following a rigid methodology to interpret “time of
peace” is eschewed by a case-by-case analysis, while Article 92’s impact on
common sense and civil rights must be taken into account. In that sense, Lee
supports reading the Third Amendment in its own light; a light that directly
affects treasured civil rights. The Declare War Clause,300 the early history of
limited wars, and the judicial and executive agreement that Congress controls
commencing war verify that declarations of war are necessary to alter the
nation’s legal status of affairs. As such, common sense would also indicate
that peacetime converts to wartime under the Third Amendment only when
Congress declares war.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer301 provided a persuasive
restriction on presidential power to alter peacetime status to wartime, thereby
affirming Congress’s authority in that regard. The Court concluded that
President Truman was not within his constitutional power when he ordered the
federal government to take possession of and operate the nation’s steel mills
absent congressional legislation during the Korean War.302
In 1950, communist North Korea invaded anti-communist South Korea,303
which led to the Korean war and United States involvement.304 President
Truman launched the United States into the war without congressional
authorization. A dispute exists as to whether Truman consulted with Congress
before acting. Some characterize Truman as unilaterally starting the war305 or
launching the United States into war without consulting Congress.306 Other
commentators defended Truman, concluding that he either consulted and

299. Id. at 236.
300. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
301. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
302. Id. at 582-83, 585.
303. Search Beat, Korean War History Guide: A Short History of the Korean War, at
http://history.searchbeat.com/koreanwar.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
304. Bickel, supra note 217, at 134.
305. See ELY, supra note 154, at 10, 53; see also Wormuth, supra note 162, at 648 (stating
that President Truman initiated an unauthorized entry into the Korean War).
306. ROBERT LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 858 (1968), cited in, Turner, supra note 162,
at 950.
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informed Congress before going to war, even though Congress did not pass a
formal resolution,307 or that his independent actions might have been an
appropriate response to an emergency.308 The latter fails as the President’s
unilateral power to respond to emergencies does not extend to defending
foreign nations from attack.309
President Truman argued he was acting under his authority as
Commander-in-Chief to prevent an emergency resulting from the nation-wide
strike at the steel mills.310 The Court appropriately concluded that a state of
war did not exist because Congress did not declare war, much like the Court
looked to Congress’s actions to determine the legal status of the quasi-war with
France.311 The Court recognized that Congress alone has the power to decide
if a legal state of war existed to justify President Truman’s actions.312
Therefore, the Court determined that Truman’s seizure of property was
unconstitutional because the nation was not formally at war,313 as a declaration
of war is the only constitutional way in which the nation can formally be at
war.314 Thus, the Court “correctly held that the President could not usurp
Congress’ domestic authority” to determine when, legally, a wartime state
exists.315 Consequently, the Court upheld the principle that a declaration of
war had important domestic effects, such as notifying the people and
authorizing Presidential wartime power.316
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, if read quickly, might appear to
contradict the conclusion that only a formal declaration of war alters the legal
status of the nation from peacetime to wartime. He concluded that “[n]othing
in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to
Congress. Of course, a state of war may in fact exist without a formal
declaration.”317 Jackson qualified his state of war proclamation by stating it is
unnecessary “to consider the legal status of the Korean enterprise to
discountenance argument based on it.”318 Moreover, while he assumed the

307. Turner, supra note 162, at 949-56.
308. Bickel, supra note 217, at 134-35.
309. See Berger, supra note 160, at 51, 65; Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1343. Although the
War Powers Resolution was not in effect before the Korean War, it provides another current
source limiting unilateral Presidential military action to attacks against the United States, its
territories or possessions and their armed forces. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2000).
310. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952).
311. Yoo, supra note 174, at 301.
312. Id.
313. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 611.
314. Id.
315. Yoo, supra note 174, at 301.
316. See id.
317. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).
318. Id. at 643.
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United States was at a war de facto,319 he did not determine if the conflict was
a war de jure. Regardless of Jackson’s unsubstantiated claim that a state of
war can exist without a declaration, his qualification of that remark and his
ultimate holding validated that a formal declaration of war is needed to alter
peacetime status to wartime status. Jackson concluded that the President could
not “vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his
own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”320
“[M]ilitary powers of the Commander-in-Chief were not to supersede
representative government of internal affairs seems obvious from the
Constitution and from elementary American history.”321 In other words,
Jackson determined the power to authorize domestic military power lies in
Congress, the legislative body, and the power to execute those laws lies with
the President, the executive body.
The Constitution’s policy, according to Jackson, is “that Congress, not the
Executive, should control utilization of the war power as an instrument of
domestic policy.”322 Consequently, Jackson provided direct support for, at
least, congressional authorization of wartime in a Third Amendment context.
Specifically, he said:
[I]n many parts of the world, a military commander can seize private housing
to shelter his troops. Not so, however, in the United States, for the Third
Amendment says, “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to
be prescribed by law.” Thus, even in war time, his seizure of needed military
housing must be authorized by Congress.323

Therefore, if Congress must authorize compelled quartering of soldiers in time
of war, they must also authorize the time of war. Because only wartime status
allows for compelled quartering of soldiers, a congressional authorization of a
limited war would not rise to the level of a formal, general war, and thus
wartime would not exist. Because wartime would not exist, Congress would
not have the subsequent ability to enact legislation authorizing the quartering
of soldiers, and the President could not order such quartering to take place.
e)

Modern Undeclared Wars and Challenges to Presidential Authority

Congressional authorization for the undeclared Vietnam War led courts to
uphold its constitutionality. That conflict obviously met the ordinary meaning

319. Id.
320. Id. at 642 (discussing President Jefferson’s message to Congress concerning his ordering
of American fleet into a naval battle with Tripoli without Congress’s sanction).
321. Id. at 644.
322. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring).
323. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. III).
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of war as well.324 Although, as we already know, the crux of the inquiry in
determining whether a wartime state of affairs existed is if Congress declared
war or not, Congress did enact the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,325 which
authorized President Johnson to commit forces in Vietnam. This was not a
declaration of war, but rather an authorization for a large-scale limited war.
Claims that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution somehow created a de facto
declaration of war are easily refutable because it was subsequently repealed.326
Unfortunately, the war continued and extended to Cambodia in 1970 and Laos
in 1971, without consultation with Congress.327
The constitutionality of the Vietnam War was repeatedly challenged.328 In
each case, the challenge was denied, but no court supported unilateral
presidential war-making. Instead, the courts required and found some form of
congressional authorization for the undeclared Vietnam War.329 The form of
authorization for the informal war was within Congress’s discretion—it did not

324. United States military involvement in Vietnam extended from 1961 to 1975. The
History Place, The Vietnam War, at http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam (last
visited Nov. 4, 2003). More than 58,000 Americans were killed in action, more than 300,000
were wounded in action, more than 2,000 were considered missing in action, and more than 700
were captured in action. Casualties—US vs NVA/VC, at http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html
(last modified Jan. 23, 2000). Approximately 1,100,000 North Vietnamese were killed in action,
and more than 600,000 were wounded in action. Id. See also Allison, supra note 254, at 91
(noting that the Vietnam War met the ordinary meaning of war).
325. Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). One commentator
concluded that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution could not authorize military action because it did not
identify an enemy state; it only allowed troops to “repel armed attack against the forces of the
United States.” Wormuth, supra note 162, at 690 (quoting Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No.
88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964)). A debate exists as to whether Congress constitutionally authorized
the Vietnam War. Some say the war was unconstitutional. See generally David C. Wright,
America in Vietnam: A Model for the Exercise of the War Powers, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. 253 (1989).
However, an argument exists that Congress authorized the Vietnam War through resolution, tying
troop commitments to treaty requirements and military appropriations. Id. at 257.
326. Berger, supra note 160, at 67.
327. Id. at 67 n.249.
328. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,
613 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1040 (2d Cir. 1971); Massachusetts v.
Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1971); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 855-56 (D. Mass.
1973).
329. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 34 (concluding that Congress approved the
prolonged, undeclared Vietnam War because it did not claim conflicting authority and steadily
supported the war); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042 (concluding that Congress met the test of
authorizing or ratifying the Vietnam War through the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by appropriating
billions of dollars for the war and expanding selective service). Cf. Da Costa, 471 F.2d at 1152
(concluding that a soldier’s challenge to the military’s tactical decisions to mine ports and harbors
in North Vietnam and continue air strikes was a political question the court did not have power to
hear).
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have to formally declare war.330 Furthermore, unilateral Presidential warmaking was appropriately limited to responding to attacks and addressing
grave emergencies.331 While the courts went too far in concluding that
unilateral Presidential war-making beyond emergency situations was an issue
Congress and the President shared, the courts still maintained that Congress
must authorize or ratify that action.332 Therefore, congressional power to
authorize war-making was indirectly sustained. Congressional control over
determining a wartime state would also follow that mantra.
Similar to the Vietnam War, Congressional authorization for the
undeclared Persian Gulf War against Iraq in 1991 led courts to uphold its
constitutionality. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and then President
George H. W. Bush ordered “the deployment of the largest American combat
force since the Vietnam War six days later.”333 In November 1990,
“[President] Bush ordered a virtual doubling of the 230,000 troops in the
Persian Gulf.”334 On January 12, 1991, Congress passed a joint resolution that
approved the use of force against Iraq when the President determined and
reported to Congress that all diplomatic avenues were exhausted.335 The word
war did not appear in the content of the Iraq Resolution, but rather only
appeared in the title of the War Powers Resolution.336 The Iraq Resolution
never said, “A state of war will hereby be declared to exist if Iraq does not
comply with the various United Nations Security Council resolutions.”337
“[T]he United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 678, [demanding]
that Iraq unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.”338 On
January 17, 1991, the United States initiated “Operation Desert Storm with
over 1,400 air sorties against [Iraq].”339 On February 24, 1991, the United

330. Drinan, 364 F. Supp. at 859-60.
331. Id. at 859 (citing Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 613-14).
332. See id. (citing Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d at 33 ). See also Orlando v. Laird, 443
F.2d at 1042.
333. Sidak, supra note 143, at 29; see also George Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing
the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, II PUB. PAPERS 1107 (Aug. 8,
1990).
334. Sidak, supra note 143, at 29; see also Letter to Congressional Leaders on the
Deployment of Additional United States Armed Forces to The Persian Gulf, II PUB. PAPERS 1617
(Nov. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Letter to Congressional Leaders].
335. Sidak, supra note 143, at 31; see also Adam Clymer, Congress Acts to Authorize War in
Gulf; Margins Are 5 Votes in Senate, 67 in House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at A1.
336. Sidak, supra note 143, at 45.
337. Id. at 47.
338. Id. at 29; see also Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 334, at 1617.
339. Sidak, supra note 143, at 31 (citing Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. and Allies Open Air War on
Iraq, Bomb Baghdad and Kuwaiti Targets; “No Choice” But Force, Bush Declares, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1991, at A1); see also Statement on Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, I PUB.
PAPERS 42 (Jan. 16, 1991).
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States commenced a ground invasion of Kuwait and liberated the country three
days later along with securing an Iraqi pledge to comply with United Nations
Security resolutions.340
Leading up to the conflict, fifty-three members of the House of
Representatives and one Senator sought a preliminary injunction preventing
President Bush from conducting the Persian Gulf War without a declaration of
war in Dellums v. Bush.341 The court denied the preliminary injunction
because it was not ripe for decision.342 Nonetheless, the court stated, “if the
[Declare] War Clause is to have its normal meaning, it excludes from the
power to declare war all branches other than the Congress.”343 Moreover, the
court stated:
If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive
military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but
only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will
be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such an
“interpretation” would evade the plain language of the Constitution, and it
cannot stand.344

The court’s plain and accurate reading of the Declare War Clause indicates
that only Congress can authorize war. If Congress does not authorize a war
and the President nevertheless commences a war, then that war would be
unconstitutional. While Dellums does not discuss the Third Amendment, if
Congress alone has the ability to declare war and the President cannot make
war on his own volition, then must not Congress declare war to alter the legal
status of the United States from peacetime to wartime? That conversion can
only be accomplished through a formal declaration of war and not through
informal congressional authorizations. Therefore, if the President could
execute the compelled quartering of soldiers without a congressional
declaration of war, even if Congress prescribed a manner for the quartering,
that execution would directly contradict Dellums’ principle that Congress alone
decides whether or not to declare war. Allowing the President to execute a
wartime power, such as the compelled quartering of soldiers in citizens’
houses, without Congress declaring war, would disregard Dellums and create a
constitutional inconsistency that would allow the President to execute the
compelled quartering of soldiers as a wartime measure regardless of whether
Congress declared war or not.
Next, if Congress could informally authorize or ratify a President’s
unilateral order to quarter soldiers, then precedent would be set allowing the

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Sidak, supra note 143, at 32.
752 F. Supp 1141, 1143 & n.1 (D.D.C. 1990).
Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1144 n.5.
Id. at 1145.
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President to undertake formal wartime measures regardless of whether
Congress declared war. This would essentially eliminate any reason for
Congress to formally declare war, as its informal authorization for such
measures would constitute an equally effective legal sanction as a declaration
of war. We must remember informal authorizations and exceptions to the
formality of the Declare War Clause must be just that—they cannot usurp the
clause’s actual formal, textual command.
Essentially, the Persian Gulf War provides a modern view of how
Congress tends to declare war without declaring war. It informally declares
war by “enact[ing] a statute or resolution intentionally styled as something
other than a declaration of war, such as a ‘limited’ declaration of war.”345
“Congress did so in its Iraq Resolution of January 12, 1991, which purported to
authorize the war that President Bush subsequently ordered [and executed]
against Iraq.”346 The Iraq Resolution’s text, however, did not formally declare
war on Iraq.347
While certain members of Congress described the Resolution as essentially
equivalent to a declaration of war for authorization purposes,348 then House
Speaker Thomas Foley said a formal declaration of war was not made
“because there is some question about whether we wish to excite or enact some
of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration of war-seizure of
property, censorship, and so forth.”349 While this statement appears to support
this article’s position that only a formal declaration of war triggers a wartime
state wherein the President may diminish many rights, such as the Third
Amendment’s protection against the compelled quartering of soldiers, this
article will eschew it because original intent is an improper interpretive
mechanism.350
In short, we do not need legislators’ alleged intent to determine that the
Iraq Resolution did not constitute a declaration of war. The Resolution’s text
did not declare war, thus no declaration was made. Accordingly, Congress
only authorized a limited war with Iraq and did not sanction a formal, declared
war. Therefore, the nation’s peacetime legal status remained, and wartime did
not exist under the Third Amendment.

345. Sidak, War, Libety and Enemy Aliens, supra note 169, at 1425.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1425 (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992)); Sidak,
supra note 143, at 43-48.
348. Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, supra note 169, at 1425-26.
349. Id. at 1426.
350. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
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A Challenge to President George W. Bush’s Authority to Wage War
Against Iraq

Before the war against Iraq, “[a] group of [United States] soldiers, parents
of soldiers and six [members of the United States House of Representatives]
filed a lawsuit to stop [President George W. Bush] from launching [the] war
against Iraq without a [congressional] declaration of war.”351 “The lawsuit
[sought] an immediate injunction against [President] Bush and Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to prevent them from launching an invasion
[against] Iraq.”352 The lawsuit contended a congressional resolution of
October 16, 2002353 “did not specifically declare war and unlawfully ceded the
decision to [the President].”354 The District Court concluded the lawsuit
presented a non-justiciable political question, and therefore it dismissed the
complaint.355 In reference to the plaintiffs’ claim that Congress did not declare
war, the Court found that Congress expressly endorsed the President’s use of
the military against Iraq through Congress’s October 16, 2002 resolution.356
Thus, the court indirectly sanctioned congressional authorization for a limited
war against Iraq.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s
decision.357 The First Circuit concluded the dispute was not ripe for
consideration and the appropriate recourse for plaintiffs’ challenge lay with the
political branches of government.358 While the opinion might have leaned too
far towards allowing presidential war-making, it nevertheless accurately
concluded that the October 2002 resolution constituted congressional
authorization for the war against Iraq.359 Accordingly, Congress’s power to
authorize limited or formal war was, to a degree, followed. As expected, the
Court did not address what constituted a formal, wartime state of affairs.

351. CNN.com, Suit Challenges Bush War Authority, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/
13/anti.war.lawsuit.ap/index.html (Feb. 14, 2003) [hereinafter CNN.com, Suit Challenges Bush
War Authority].
352. Id.
353. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 [hereinafter Authorization I].
354. CNN.com, Suit Challenges Bush War Authority, supra note 351.
355. Doe v. Bush, 257 F. Supp. 2d 436, 437 (D. Mass. 2003).
356. Id. at 440 (memorializing the court’s order and memorandum issued in open court,
following hearing on February 24, 2003).
357. Doe v. Bush, 322 F.3d 133, 144 (1st Cir. 2003).
358. Id.
359. Id.
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Analogous Constitutional Provisions to the Declare War Clause

The full balance of war powers indicates that Congress authorizes war,
while the President executes war. Congress may “declare [w]ar,”360 “may raise
and support [a]rmies,”361 may “provide and maintain a [n]avy,”362 may “make
[r]ules for the [g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and naval [f]orces,”363
issue “[l]etters of [m]arque and [r]eprisal,”364 call up the militia,365 organize,
arm, and discipline the militia366 and make “rules concerning [c]apture on
[l]and and [w]ater.”367 Finally, in relation to Congress’s powers, “[n]o
[m]oney shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in [c]onsequence of
[a]ppropriations made by [l]aw.”368 Because these powers connect with the
power of declaring war, Congress must also have the power to determine when
war exists.369 On the other hand, “[t]he President [is the] Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the [m]ilitia of the several
states.”370 Also, “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every [s]tate in [t]he
Union a [r]epublican [f]orm of [g]overnment and, shall protect each state
against [i]nvasion.”371
These provisions create a constitutional system wherein Congress controls
every conceivable war-making or war-authorizing power, while the President
commands the armed forces when Congress authorizes their use and defends
the nation from attack in emergency situations. Congress decides if an army or
navy exists.372 How could the President control whether wartime exists if he
does not control whether a military force exists to effectuate a war? Congress
further controls the military’s funding and regulation and decides if private
individuals can conduct military operations for the United States by granting
them commissions, or letters of marque and reprisal.373 The President is left
only to command any force provided. In fact, the President may not
360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
361. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
362. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
363. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
364. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
365. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
366. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
367. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
368. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
369. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion For a Preliminary Injunction, Doe
v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/
doebush21303mol.pdf (Feb. 13, 2003).
370. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
371. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Symposium, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Roles of
Congress, The President, and The Courts: The President’s Powers as Commander-in-Chief
Versus Congress’ War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 19 (1988).
372. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
373. Lobel, supra note 85, at 1041.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE

641

commence any action except a defense against an attack, an emergency
situation where states are subject to invasion or their republican form of
government is threatened.374 Thus, in a constitutional system where essentially
all war-making and war-authorizing power lay with the Congress, the power to
declare a wartime state must also lay with Congress. Essentially, Congress is
required to “initiate hostilities, not simply [to] act to override unilateral
[Presidential] action through the use of the funding power.”375 This creates a
consistent, logical balance of war powers. Naturally then, reading Congress’s
power to declare war as a power to declare a wartime status meets the
analogous war powers present in the Constitution.
4.

Is Wartime Present in the War on Terrorism, Iraq or North Korea?

These three conflicts reiterate the modern view that a formal declaration of
war is unnecessary for a President to conduct military affairs, but
congressional authorization is needed for the President to conduct military
operations short of a formal war.376 Congress passed two resolutions—one
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and one in October 2002
concerning Iraq. The first resolution authorizes the President to use force
against terrorists.377 The second resolution authorizes the President to use
force against Iraq. 378 Neither resolution mentions North Korea and no military
conflict has occurred with North Korea. At the outset, therefore, war cannot be
present with North Korea. Thus, compelled quartering of CIA or FBI agents
could only potentially take place during a future war against North Korea. The
War on Terrorism and the war against Iraq need further review.
a)

Is Wartime Present in the War on Terrorism?

Congress authorized President Bush to conduct a limited war in the War on
Terrorism.379 The Congressional Resolution does not declare war, but rather
provides:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by

374. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
375. Lobel, supra note 85, at 1079.
376. David C. Wright, Comment, America in Vietnam: A Model for the Exercise of the War
Powers, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. 253, 258 (1989) (citing Rushkoff, supra note 156, at 1772; Ratner,
The Coordinated Warmaking Power—Legislative, Executive and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL L.
REV. 461, 465 (1971)).
377. Authorization I, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
378. Authorization II, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
379. For a review of the history and facts of the War on Terrorism, see supra note 1.
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such nations, organizations or persons . . . . Consistent with [] the War Powers
Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of []the War Powers
Resolution . . . . Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the
War Powers Resolution.380

The Resolution does not declare a war on terrorism or any nation or foreign
government. It only authorizes the use of “all necessary and appropriate
force.”381 The Resolution does not declare war, nor does it mention the word
war, except for its reference to the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers
Resolution, as discussed earlier, authorizes the President to use force through
“(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization,” or (3) defense of
the United States.382 Congress chose not to declare war. Instead it provided
“specific statutory authorization” for President Bush to use force against
terrorists.383 Thus, the Resolution cannot be considered a declaration of war.
Therefore peacetime, in reference to the War on Terrorism, remains the legal
status of the United States. The United States is not at wartime under the Third
Amendment, and compelled quartering of CIA and FBI agents cannot take
place under the meaning of war during the War on Terrorism.
b)

Is Wartime Present in the War Against Iraq?

At the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, “Iraq agreed to United
Nations Security Resolution 687, which required [it to stop developing]
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, destroy all existing weapons . . .
and their delivery systems, and allow United Nations weapons inspections.”384
“Iraq . . . repeatedly . . . breach[ed] this agreement . . . [and] ended cooperation
with the inspections program in 1998.”385 “[T]he United States and other
nations . . . enforced a no-fly zone near the Kuwaiti border and . . . launched
missile strikes against Iraq.”386 In 1998, Congress passed a joint resolution
stating, “Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations, and . . . the President is urged to take appropriate action, in
accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to
bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.”387 Also in 1998,
Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized assistance for
“‘Iraqi democratic opposition organizations,’ and declared that it should be

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Authorization I, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224-25 (2001).
Id. at § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 229.
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2000).
Authorization I, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(b)(1), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 135-136 (1st Cir. 2003).
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 105-235, 112 Stat. 1538, 1541 (1998)).
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United States policy to remove . . . Saddam Hussein from power.”388 The Act
specifically limited the use of military force by stating it should not “be
construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed
Forces.”389 None of the aforementioned congressional enactments declare war
against Iraq or authorize the use of force against Iraq. To the contrary,
Congress specifically precluded such an authorization, and emphasized that the
Constitution and federal laws, which obviously include the Declare War
Clause and the War Powers Resolution, should be followed.
In September 2002, “President Bush called for a renewed effort to demand
Iraqi disarmament and indicated . . . military force would be necessary if
diplomacy” failed.390 Iraq allowed weapons inspectors into the country, but
did not comply with prior United Nations resolutions.391 In October 2002,
Congress authorized President Bush to conduct a limited war against Iraq. The
congressional Resolution did not declare war, but rather provided:
The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he
determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq.
....
Consistent with [] the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this
section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of [] the War Powers Resolution . . . . Nothing in this joint resolution
supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.392

Just as the Resolution against terrorism did not declare war, the Iraq
Resolution did not declare war against Iraq. It only authorized President Bush
to “defend the national security”393 and “enforce all relevant United
Nations . . . resolutions.”394 And just like the Resolution against terrorism, the
Iraq Resolution’s authorization of force provisions does not mention the word
war, except for its reference to the War Powers Resolution. In fact, the Iraq

388. Id. (quoting Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-338, §§ 3, 4, 112 Stat. 3178,
3179 (1998)).
389. Doe, 322 F.3d at 136 n.3.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Authorization II, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002); see S.C. Res.
1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) (declaring Iraq in
material breach of its obligations and offering it a final opportunity to comply with disarmament
obligations), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2003).
393. Authorization II, Pub. L. No. 107-243, §3(a)(1), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002).
394. Id.
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Resolution’s War Powers Resolution provisions in sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(2)
follow the Resolution against terrorism’s War Powers Resolutions provisions
in Section 2(b)(1) and 2(b)(2), verbatim.395 Thus, both resolutions chose not to
declare war. Instead they both granted “specific statutory authorization” for
the President to use force.396 Thus, the Iraq Resolution, like the Resolution
against terrorism, cannot be considered a declaration of war.397
On March 19, 2003, the United States commenced military action against
Iraq.398 On May 1, 2003, President Bush stated major combat operations were
over,399 which essentially constituted a preliminary American victory, as the
Iraqi leadership was no longer in control of the country. Since then, however,
sporadic guerilla warfare-like attacks have been launched against United States
soldiers.400
Peacetime, in reference to the war against Iraq, remains the legal status of
the nation. Since the start of combat, Congress has not repealed or amended
the Iraq Resolution, nor has it declared war against Iraq. Accordingly, the
United States is not at wartime under the Third Amendment. Compelled
quartering of CIA or FBI agents could not take place in a war against Iraq
under the meaning of war.
Because this article only starts and complies with the text, it will proceed
to analyze the historical understanding of the Third Amendment, Third
Amendment jurisprudence and analogous areas of the law.401
III. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE THIRD AMENDMENT
A historical understanding of the Third Amendment can support, but not
carry, a Third Amendment analysis. History shows what happened over time
concerning quartering of soldiers and how the founding era dealt with the

395. Id.; Authorization I, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(b), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
396. Authorization II, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3(c), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002);
Authorization I, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(b), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
397. The Preamble of the Iraq Resolution refers to the “war on terrorism.” Authorization II,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, pmbl., 116 Stat. 1489, 1500 (2002). However, that reference does not
declare a war on terrorism, nor does it propose to supplant the Resolution against terrorism. The
categorization of a “war on terrorism,” like the categorization of the last three undeclared wars
the United States prosecuted as war (the Persian Gulf War, the Vietnam War, the Korean War),
does not create a congressional declaration of war. Instead, they are simply ways of identifying
certain conflicts, just like the “War on Drugs” identifies multiple efforts to combat the nation’s
drug problem.
398. War Tracker: March 19, supra note 149. Two hundred forty two thousand United States
troops were present at the war against Iraq’s commencement. See id.
399. See Special Report, supra note 2.
400. See CNN.com, U.S. Deaths in Iraq Surpass ‘End of Major Combat’ Total, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/08/26/sprj.irq.intl.main/index.html (Aug. 26, 2003).
401. See, e.g., Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 41, at
100.
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issue. Therefore, history can help illustrate why the Third Amendment was
adopted. It can also provide persuasive material for how the amendment
should be interpreted. History cannot, however, define what the Third
Amendment means. Its text should do that. In this instance, however, with
little to examine through case law, history provides a more important role in
determining the Third Amendment’s meaning. History can help extract the
doctrinal principles that the Third Amendment’s text has infrequently initiated.
Fortunately, there is an abundance of historical material providing a continuum
of consistent values concerning compelled quartering of soldiers in citizens’
houses. The resistance to the compelled quartering of soldiers occurred over
centuries, with the emphasis being more against the action of government
agents being quartered in a house than against the specific individual
quartered. The nation’s founding debate regarding whether a standing army
should even exist shows citizen distrust for the soldiery. It supports a civil
rights friendly reading of the Third Amendment.
A.

The History of Quartering Soldiers

The protection against compelled quartering of soldiers in citizens’ houses
dates back at least to 1628. “The English Petition of Right of 1628 [stated]
that ‘great companies of soldiers and mariners have been dispersed into divers
counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills have been
compelled to receive them into their houses . . . .’”402 The Petition of Right’s
mention of mariners, alongside soldiers, shows a prohibition against more than
just soldiers, but other military oriented government agents quartered in a
house as well. A mariner is “one who navigates or assists in navigating a
ship.”403 Mariners are considered seamen or sailors.404 From a historical view,
this verifies this article’s textual conclusion that a soldier, as the Third
Amendment indicates, does not just mean a traditional infantryman. This early
prohibition against compelled quartering of soldiers provides an equivalent
quartering prohibition against traditional members of a Navy. As flying was
not yet invented, and thus no Air Force existed, one can conclude that there
was no way in which a prohibition against pilots, airmen, or a like term was
possible.405 If such a military force existed, it presumably appears it would
402. 1791-1991 THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND 28 (1991) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS
BEYOND]; see also 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 413. “The petition of right moreover enacts, that no soldier shall be quartered on the
subject without his own consent.” Id. (citation omitted).
403. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 697; see also AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 799
(defining a mariner as “one who navigates a ship”).
404. WEBSTER’S, supra note 62, at 697; see AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 799
(defining a mariner as “a sailor or seaman”).
405. The Constitution authorizes only the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. However, a reasonable interpretation of the clause, as well
AND
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have been subjected to the same quartering prohibition, just as soldiers and
mariners were. Accordingly, history shows a broad military quartering
prohibition, which emphasizes the citizenry’s right against compelled
quartering as the thrust of the protection, not necessarily the type of person that
is quartered.
Therefore, any review of the Third Amendment’s historical development
must start with a broad notion of the protection in regard to which types of
persons can be prevented from being quartered. Thus, the English Petition of
Right’s principle and the Third Amendment’s historical foundation are
preserved through modern theory and application. To foster a narrow
interpretation of soldier within the Third Amendment would contradict the
broader mandate of the English Petition of Right. This would eliminate the
historical context that the protection formed. That is an unacceptable historical
view of the Third Amendment.
The Third Amendment’s “historical origins [are also] rooted in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689.”406 The English Bill of Rights provided that the King
had “endeavoured to subvert . . . the laws and liberties of [the] kingdom . . .
[b]y raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace,
without consent of parliament, and quartering soldiers contrary to law.”407
Britain’s failure to recognize the rights of its citizens regarding compelled
quartering permeated through British and colonial American history. One
commentary noted:
As a result of the overthrow of James II and the creation of the Bill of Rights
of 1689, the power of the crown to raise and deploy military forces was
severely curtailed during the 18th century. Britain’s failure to apply the same
restraints in dealing with the American colonists helped lead to the American
Revolution.408

Under “the Quartering Act of 1765, the British Parliament required
American colonists [to pay for] the feeding and sheltering [of] British troops
stationed” in the colonies.409 The Act authorized the quartering of soldiers in
inns, livery stables and ale houses if there was insufficient room for them in
their barracks.410 The Boston Pamphlet of 1772 protested quartering of
soldiers by stating, “introducing and quartering standing armies in a free
as common sense, leads to an obvious conclusion that the President is the Commandeer-in-Chief
of the Air Force and the Marines. Incidentally, that scenario exemplifies why a wholly textualist
interpretation of the Constitution is inappropriate. It could lead to an absurd result such as the
President not being granted command control over the Air Force or Marines.
406. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 966 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II) (Kaufman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
407. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 269 (1999).
408. BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28.
409. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
410. Id. at 967 (citation omitted).
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country in times of peace without the consent of the people . . . is, and always
has been deemed a violation of their rights as freemen.”411
This pronouncement shows the enduring historical prohibition against
compelled quartering of soldiers. The Boston Pamphlet emphasized that the
practice was at all times a violation of the rights of freemen. This naturalrights-like position against compelled quartering shows an unyielding stance
against it, no matter when and where it occurred, and no matter what form of
government or rights existed. Accordingly, the Boston Pamphlet enunciated
the dominant ideological thought of the era—that the government could not
infringe upon certain natural rights.412 Even with the colonial protest, the
quartering acts continued. This increased the tension between colonists and
the British government, as Judge Kaufman explained in Engblom II:
The Quartering Act of 1774, one of the “Intolerable Acts” the British
Parliament enacted as tensions heightened following the Boston Tea Party,
authorized much more intrusive intervention.
Apparently, before the
Revolution, the City of Boston provided barracks for British troops only on an
island in Boston Harbor from which the soldiers could not move quickly to the
City in the event of an uprising or disturbance by the colonists. To remedy this
strategic disadvantage, the Quartering Act of 1774 authorized the British
commanders to quarter their troops wherever necessary, including the homes
of the colonists.413

The Quartering Act “fed ancient fears of billeting a standing army among
civilians.”414 The gradual colonial resistance came to a climax with the signing
of the Declaration of Independence. The resistance directly protested the
British military presence by stating “the King ‘has kept among us, in times of
peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures.’”415
Subsequently, the Third Amendment formed from the English Bill of Rights,
the Virginia Convention Bill of Rights, the Maryland Majority, the state of
New Hampshire, the New York Bill of Rights, and the North Carolina Bill of

411. BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28.
412. See David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to
Professor McAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313, 326 (1992); see also Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth
Amendment, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 599 (1991) (citing 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
395-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
413. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28 (“The Quartering Act authorized
colonial governors to open uninhabited buildings for the use of soldiers whenever they saw fit.”);
William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History, 136 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 25 (1992) (noting that one of the Intolerable Acts authorized the quartering of soldiers
in private homes of the colonists).
414. BILL OF RIGHTS AND BEYOND, supra note 402, at 28.
415. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 967 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Rights.416 “[A]fter casting off the yoke of colonial rule,” the Third
Amendment passed as part of the Bill of Rights.417 Similar provisions were
passed in many state constitutions and exist to this day alongside the Third
Amendment.418

416. LEVY, supra note 407, at 264. It is not this author’s belief that prior drafts of the Third
Amendment, or any amendment for that matter, shed authoritative light on interpreting the
amendment itself. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. However, for historical purposes
only, a progression of the amendment’s text follows: “That no Soldier in time of peace ought to
be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in such manner
only as the laws direct.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 277. Next, James Madison proposed, “No
Soldiers shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor at
any time, but in a manner warranted by law.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 282. The amendment
reported by the Select Committee stated, “No soldiers shall in time of peace be quartered in any
house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 285. The House of Representatives passed the amendment as,
“No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner,
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” See LEVY, supra note 407, at 288.
The amendment was passed in the Senate in almost the exact same form. The only change was a
comma added after the word “house.” LEVY, supra note 407, at 292.
417. See Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 966 (Kaufman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
418. Most state constitutions have a provision mirroring the Third Amendment. Specifically,
twenty-four state constitutions have provisions paralleling the Third Amendment. See ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 28; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 18; HAW. CONST. art. I, §
18; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 21; IND. CONST. art. I, § 34; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 15; KAN. CONST. §
14; ME. CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. CONST. art. 31; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVII, § 28; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 8; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 18; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 27;
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 16; N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 7; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 31; OHIO. CONST. art. I, §
13; OR. CONST. art. I, § 28; PA. CONST. art I, § 23; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 19; TENN. CONST. art. I, §
27; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 25. Two state constitutions combine language paralleling the Third
Amendment’s text with language preventing a standing army in peacetime. See ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 31. Ten state constitutions combine language paralleling the
Third Amendment’s text with language placing military power subordinate to civil power. See
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 20; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 22; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 12; MO. CONST.
art. I, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 32; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 14; S.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 16; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 20; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 25. Four state
constitutions combine language paralleling the Third Amendment’s text with language preventing
a standing army in peacetime and language placing military power subordinate to civil power.
See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 27; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 5; KY. CONST. § 22; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 19.
The South Carolina Constitution combines language paralleling the Third Amendment’s text with
language preventing a standing army in peacetime, language placing military power subordinate
to civil power and language paralleling the Second Amendment. See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”). The West Virginia
Constitution combines language paralleling the Third Amendment’s text with language
preventing a standing army in peacetime, language placing military power subordinate to civil
power and language preventing civilians from being tried or punished in military court. See W.
VA. CONST. art. III, § 12. Eight states, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
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The historical progression of what we now consider Third Amendment
fears forms a principle of citizen dissolution of being compelled to keep and
support soldiers in their homes. The historical evolution of this citizen
statement has been remarkably clear and unwavering over centuries.
Moreover, the sentiment never appears to focus on the specific type of soldier
or army personnel. While the amendment grew largely out of fear of undue
influence by the military, a responsible analysis of the amendment must not
stop there.419 One of the Third Amendment’s purposes was to provide civilian
control of the military, however, John Hart Ely noted that “there is obviously
something else at stake, a desire to protect the privacy of the home from prying
government eyes, to say nothing of the annoyance of uninvited guests. Both
process and value seem to be involved here.”420 History shows the complaint
causing citizen fear, angst and protest is the compelled quartering of
government military agents, not the specific type of agent quartered. If the
type of agent quartered was the key principle, and not the action of compelled
quartering, then the historical record would not emphasize why traditional
soldiers, as opposed to the action of the compelled quartering, drew the
citizenry’s fury. The long record seems devoid of that emphasis, which
indicates the colonial protest and subsequent constitutional protection is
against the compelled quartering of government military agents in the
citizenry’s houses. Because the military was much more rudimentary in nature
during the colonial period, and because there were no sophisticated Executive
Branch agencies like the CIA or FBI present, the citizenry of that time could
not launch protests against such agencies. CIA and FBI agents, many of whom
perform multiple military duties easily matching the ordinary meaning of
soldier, are the type of prying government eyes and uninvited guests the Third
Amendment was designed to protect against. Thus, to not apply the Third
Amendment’s prohibitions against CIA or FBI agents would be to ignore the
amendment’s historical context, outlook and purpose.
This historical progression of resisting British quartering of soldiers in
houses shows a consistent aversion toward quartering of soldiers. The
quartering was part of a series of actions that pushed the colonies to the
breaking point, thereby leading to the Declaration of Independence and
eventually the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, including the Third
Amendment. To advance a Third Amendment jurisprudence that would almost
eradicate the amendment’s protections would fly in the face of the historical
developments that led to the colonists’ break from British rule and the
subsequent formation of the United States.
A current constitutional

Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin do not have a constitutional provision paralleling the Third
Amendment.
419. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95 (1980).
420. Id.
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interpretation cutting across the reasoning behind the development of a
particular right and the overall scheme of the Constitution invalidates the right
itself. Such interpretation destroys a layer of the Constitution through
inappropriate means. If the people decide to amend or repeal the Third
Amendment, even in light of its place in historical order, it would be
permissible.421 Without that step, however, a historical understanding of the
Third Amendment shows a strong citizen rebuttal toward compelled quartering
of soldiers.
History shows the colonists resisted the action of having a government
military agent quartered in their home without their consent. The colonists
objected to providing shelter and food to these soldiers. The emphasis was not
on the specific type of government military agent the colonists despised;
rather, the colonists despised the duty of providing shelter and food to these
soldiers as well as being forced to shelter unwanted, and potentially prying,
government eyes. If the British required compelled quartering of other
government military agents in houses wherein the owner would have to
provide free shelter and food, the colonial resistance probably would have been
the same.
Finally, as shown above, many CIA and FBI agents perform numerous
military operations making them soldiers. These agents perform activities very
similar to that of a traditional soldier from the colonial era.422 Thus, even if the
type of government military agent was dispositive in Third Amendment
interpretation, a CIA or FBI agent quartered in a house to advance these
military duties while combating a terrorist, Iraqi, or North Korean enemy
would meet the criteria of a soldier from a historical lens. CIA or FBI agents
only meeting the broadest ordinary meanings of soldier, and not the more
traditional meanings, would still be the type of prying and powerful
government agent the broad historical prohibition opposed. Accordingly,
either type of CIA or FBI agent would be subjected to Third Amendment
standards.
B.

The Debate Regarding Standing Armies

Not only did the quartering of soldiers draw ire from citizens through
British and colonial history, the issue of whether there should even be a
standing army, or a standing army in peacetime, was a poignant point of debate
during the forming of the United States and the enactment of the
Constitution.423 A review of the historical sentiment in favor and against

421. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
422. Id.
423. As stated earlier, debates and drafting history are irrelevant when analyzing a law.
However, exploring the historical circumstances and general philosophical backdrop to a
particular issue is an appropriate area to explore in understanding a law.
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standing armies shows the citizenry’s sentiment toward a military presence. It
sheds light on how the Third Amendment should be interpreted. This does not
mean that this author believes that original intent now matters. The
Constitution speaks to standing armies.
The language controls that
provision—its drafters’ intentions are irrelevant when interpreting its
However, to understand the historical understanding and
meaning.424
philosophical backdrop of the Third Amendment, historical commentary and
documents on how the citizenry felt about governmental military power in
peacetime provides persuasive material on how the Third Amendment should
be interpreted in order for it to correlate with the Constitution’s other
provisions dealing with military power and civil liberties. In other words, if
history shows that the citizenry was skeptical about allowing a standing army
in peacetime because of its threat to civil liberties, then the Third
Amendment’s similar provisions for protecting civil liberties against the
soldiery should align with that sentiment, not contradict it.
There was a significant citizen sentiment against the mere presence of
standing armies, particularly in peacetime. The citizen aversion to the British
Military presence was eloquently expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, which contended, “the King ‘has kept among us, in times of
peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures.’”425 Antifederalists felt that the federal legislature’s power to raise and support armies
during peacetime and wartime, and its power to control the militia,
consolidated government and destroyed liberty.426 Six of the original states
expressed serious concern about standing armies. The Pennsylvania and North
Carolina constitutions stated, “as standing armies in time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up.”427 New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland’s state constitutions provided,
“standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up
without the consent of the legislature.”428 These statements focused on the
standing army’s threat to liberty. The soldiers’ power fostered fear in some of
the citizenry. However, that does not mean soldiers, in and of themselves,
424. Therefore, this article will not consider commentary made during the debate regarding
standing armies at the Philadelphia Convention. That debate is accounted for in the text of
Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
425. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 967 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II) (Kaufman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Great Britain criticized standing armies as well, before
the American Revolution, by stating “the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom
in time of peace, unless with the consent of Parliament, was against law.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
26 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis in original). Thus, one may say that the American people
received “a hereditary impression of [the] danger to liberty from [the presence of] standing
armies” in peacetime. Id.
426. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, “Brutus,” Essay I.
427. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added).
428. Id. (emphasis in original).
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were the citizenry’s concern. It was what the soldiers could do, namely
destroy liberty, that concerned them. If another government military agent had
similar power, the citizen fear would be the same. Government agents, in
today’s world, capable of the potential destruction of liberty must be equally
scrutinized alongside the traditional army. CIA and FBI agents, with powerful
military, intelligence, and investigative authority, would be the type of libertythreatening governmental presence the citizenry would have resisted.
Applying the same scrutiny to them as the colonists did to the standing army
would ensure the citizen voice opposing threats to liberty will be heard as
loudly as it was during the Founding era and before.
Supporters of a standing army advocated a limited role out of fear of
governmental oppression of rights. As the essay of “Brutus” described:
As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and have often
been the means of overturning the best constitutions of government, no
standing army, or troops of any description whatsoever, shall be raised or kept
up by the legislature, except so many as shall be necessary for guards to the
arsenals of the United States, or for garrisons to such posts on the frontiers, as
it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to hold, to secure the inhabitants, and
facilitate the trade with the Indians: unless when the United States are
threatened with an attack or invasion from some foreign power, in which case
the legislature shall be authorised to raise an army to be prepared to repel the
attack; provided that no troops whatsoever shall be raised in time of peace,
without the assent of two thirds of the members, composing both houses of the
legislature.429

This anti-federalist stance against “troops of any description
whatsoever,”430 and a requirement that a two-thirds majority assent to raising a
standing army in peacetime, exemplifies the broad dismay and distrust for
government military forces and their agents.431 Because sophisticated
intelligence and investigative executive branch agencies such as the FBI and
CIA were not present at that time, the anti-federalist sentiment against any
troops and the federalists’ cautionary support of the military verifies a sizeable
citizen rebuttal existed to a wide range of government military entities, not just
traditional soldiers.
On any scale, James Madison, from a federalist perspective, warned that a
standing military was “an object of laudable circumspection and
precaution.”432 He argued the nation “will exert all its prudence in diminishing
both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be

429.
430.
431.
432.

THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, “Brutus,” Essay X.
Id.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
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inauspicious to its liberties.”433 Further cautionary federalist advocacy for the
standing army came from Alexander Hamilton, who stated:
[T]he people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The
laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies—the
civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted nor confounded with the
principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army renders
the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and the citizens, not
habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its
oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery: They view them with a spirit of
jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power
which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army
under such circumstances, may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small
faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce
encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.434

The Constitution eventually codified Congress’s ability to raise a standing
army, subject to many limitations, presumably to appease those anti-federalists
opposed to a standing army and following a cautionary federalist advocacy
paradigm of such forces Hamilton and others advanced. Specifically, the
Constitution provides:
Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years; . . . To provide and maintain a Navy; . . . to make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . . To provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions; . . . To provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.435

Hamilton believed the clause forbidding “the appropriation of money for
the support of an army for any longer period than two years [is] a
precaution . . . [that] will appear to be a great and real security against the
keeping up of troops without evident necessity.436 Accordingly, while the
federalist position appeared to prevail in the Constitution’s textual grant to
Congress to undertake many war-making and war-authorizing powers, even
those who supported Congress’s powers in that regard cautioned against the
power of a standing army.
The issues of whether a standing army should exist, and if so, if it should
exist during peacetime, are not exactly on point with the issue of when and
433.
434.
435.
436.

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12-16.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton).
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how compelled quartering of soldiers can take place. Those issues, however,
do shed light on how to handle constitutional issues when governmental
military powers and citizen rights intersect. If there was a serious intellectual
debate on whether or not a standing army should even exist, then there were
serious concerns about the powers of that army. With proponents of a standing
army limiting its power and cautioning against its might, there appears to be a
strong sentiment against military powers and an equally strong sentiment in
favor of civil rights. If such sentiments existed, it would seem inconsistent
with the ideals that built the United States to then advance a Third Amendment
jurisprudence that would substantially heighten the powers of the military over
civil rights. The level of civil skepticism in abdicating power to the military
would, thus, promote similar civil skepticism against allowing a member of
that military to be quartered in a citizen’s house without the citizen’s consent.
Consequently, the Third Amendment must be viewed in accord with the
relevant historical vision of how the citizenry and a standing army would
interact. To that end, a broad reading protecting citizen rights and a narrow
reading advancing government power in the Third Amendment would be
consistent with the historical underpinnings of the national debate surrounding
the military’s power. A historically sufficient reading of soldier would
encompass CIA and FBI agents as soldiers, while limiting the compelled
quartering of them to particular circumstances—those in which Congress
formally declares war, and a law is enacted describing how quartering may
take place.
IV. THIRD AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Engblom v. Carey, the one case realistically construing the Third
Amendment, viewed it as protecting civil rights and deterring government
infringement upon such rights.437 In that case, striking correction officers were
evicted from their on-site residences in order to quarter National
Guardsmen.438 The New York Governor “activated the New York National
Guard . . . to perform security-related functions at state prison facilities” when
the statewide correction officers’ strike took place.439 The court quickly
announced the death of Third Amendment legal analysis by stating, “[a]side
from the lower court’s opinion in this case[,] there are no reported opinions
involving the literal application of the Third Amendment.”440 The court

437. See Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II).
438. Id. at 958-59.
439. See Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Engblom I), rev’d on other
grounds, 677 F.2d 957 (1982).
440. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 959 n.1 (citation omitted).
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appropriately eschewed a few prior opinions as “far-fetched, metaphorical
applications” of the Third Amendment.441
The issue in Engblom II turned on whether the on-site residences of the
corrections officers were “houses” under the Third Amendment. Therefore,
the opinion did not address the crucial components of this article—what are
“soldiers,” what is “time of peace” and what is “time of war.” However,
because the court reversed a grant of summary judgment that dismissed the
striking correction officers’ Third Amendment claim, the court had to at least
minimally address those issues in order to determine a Third Amendment
claim could proceed. Moreover, the court’s analysis, while focused on the
home aspect of the Third Amendment, established a context in which the
amendment’s terms are to be interpreted and applied. Thus, by analogy, the
manner in which “home” was analyzed should be applied to the manner in
which “soldier,” “time of peace,” and “time of war” should be analyzed.
The court glanced at the meaning of soldier when it concluded that it
“agree[d] with the district court’s conclusion that the National Guardsmen are
‘Soldiers’ within the meaning of the Third Amendment.”442 The District Court
provided little analysis when it stated “the [National] Guard is the modern day
successor to the Militia reserved to the states by Art. I, [§] 8, cls. 15, 16 of the
Constitution, and members of that organization must be considered
‘soldiers.’”443 A more in-depth analysis might not have been necessary as
National Guardsmen appear to be enlisted military personnel similar to that of
traditional soldiers.
In this respect, the court’s analysis of what house and owner mean are
more relevant than what it concluded soldier to mean with respect to this
article. House and owner do not have a fixed meaning in relation to the
correction officers who resided in on-site facilities. Thus, the court, similar to
this article, had to apply a somewhat unique factual scenario to the Third
Amendment’s text. Engblom II had to determine whether or not a correction
officer who lived on an on-site facility was the owner of a house.444 This
article determines whether a CIA or FBI agent who is quartered in a house is a
soldier, and when and how a War On Terrorism, Iraq, or North Korea
constitutes a time of war.

441. Id. (citing Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Executives Sec. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470, 473 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (concluding that a subpoena does not violate the Third Amendment); Jones v.
Sec’y of Def., 346 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D. Minn. 1972) (concluding that army reservists’ duty to
work a parade did not create an incubator and hatchery of swarms of bureaucrats to be quartered
as storm troopers on the people in violation of the Third Amendment)).
442. Engblom II, 677 F.2d. at 961.
443. Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Engblom I), rev’d on other
grounds, 677 F.2d 957 (1982).
444. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 959.
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Engblom II follows a “text-starting” and “broad-finishing” method in
determining that correction officers who lived in facility-owned residences
could be owners of houses within the context of the Third Amendment. The
court initially noted that the definition of house, “a structure intended for
human habitation[,] . . . readily encompasses the various modern forms of
dwelling.”445 The court rejected a “rigid reading of the word ‘Owner’ in the
Third Amendment.”446 It stated:
[It] would be wholly anomalous when viewed, for example, alongside
established Fourth Amendment doctrine, since it would lead to an apartment
tenant’s being denied a privacy right against the forced quartering of troops,
while that same tenant, or his guest, or even a hotel visitor, would have a
legitimate privacy interest protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures.447

Accordingly, the court determined that “property-based privacy interests
protected by the Third Amendment are not limited . . . to those arising out of
fee simple ownership but extend to those recognized and permitted by society
[because they are] founded on lawful occupation or possession with a legal
right to exclude others.”448
Applying the Engblom II court’s reasoning to the issue in this article, if the
Third Amendment protects against compelled quartering of soldiers, which
includes National Guardsmen, it protects against the quartering of CIA or FBI
agents. Engblom II commands a broad reading of the Third Amendment’s
terms.449 While National Guardsmen might, on the surface, share more
similarities with traditional soldiers than with CIA or FBI agents, the
similarities between CIA or FBI agents and traditional soldiers in reference to
their duties against enemy military operatives or terrorists are very similar.
CIA or FBI agents quartered in a house would be acting as arms of the federal
government, just as enlisted soldiers represent the federal government. Their
purpose or duty would be to protect American citizens against enemy military
attacks. The only real distinction would appear to be that certain CIA or FBI
agents who do not perform military-oriented duties, could be quartered. This
distinction, however, is not controlling in a Third Amendment context. The
text and history show a broad, enveloping protection from government
intrusion. CIA and FBI agents would be subjected to Third Amendment
445. Id. at 962 n.11.
446. Id. at 962.
447. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (concluding a person in friend’s
apartment where narcotics were found was subjected to an unconstitutional search)); United
States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 333-35 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that hotel room occupants
enjoy Fourth Amendment protection); United States v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1980)
(concluding an apartment tenant enjoys Fourth Amendment protection).
448. Id. at 962.
449. Engblom II, 677 F.2d at 962.
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prohibitions even if their duties were less military-oriented. Engblom II’s
expansive reading of owner creates precedent requiring an expansive reading
of soldier. Consequently, CIA and FBI agents, both powerful and skilled
Executive Branch agents, just like traditional soldiers, would meet the meaning
of soldier under the Third Amendment jurisprudence Engblom II established.
We must also remember that the Third Amendment does not enunciate a
prohibition against compelled quartering of soldiers in houses based upon the
soldiers’ duty. Instead, there exists a blanket prohibition. Regardless of
whether reconnaissance, combat, or mere residence is taking place because of
the quartering, a non-consenting house owner during peacetime may refuse to
allow a soldier to be quartered in his house.
Finally, Engblom II’s lack of analysis of “soldier,” “time of peace,” and
“time of war” helped evaluate those terms. The court assumed peacetime
existed because it allowed the Third Amendment claim to proceed when the
National Guard occupied the homes of on-site state correction officers even
though the quartering was not prescribed through law. Nowhere in the opinion
does the court discuss whether or not peacetime or wartime is present, if
Congress declared war, or if Congress or the state legislature prescribed a
manner by law regarding how soldiers were to be quartered. Obviously, if
wartime were present, a manner prescribed by law to quarter soldiers would
trump an owner’s disapproval of soldiers staying in his home. The absence of
this discussion regarding peace or war infers that a time of peace existed. A
factual question existed as to whether a soldier was quartered in a home
without consent of its owner. Thus, a Third Amendment claim survived
because in time of peace, an owner must consent to the quartering of a soldier
in his home. Further discussion would be necessary if war existed, at least to
mention that no manner prescribed by law existed to authorize the quartering
of soldiers without an owner’s consent.
As such, it appears the court did not believe the Cold War at that time
between the United States and the Soviet Union, constituted a war.
Presumably, the court felt this way because either the Cold War did not meet
the ordinary meaning of war, or Congress failed to declare or authorize war
against the Soviet Union. The Cold War was “a state of . . . rivalry existing
between the Soviet and American blocs of nations following World War II.”450
This rivalry, or any cold war rivalry for that matter, is “a state of political
tension and military rivalry between nations, stopping short of actual full-scale
war.”451 This is important concerning the potential for compelling quartering
of soldiers during the War on Terrorism. First, as this article showed
previously, the War on Terrorism is not between two nations, but rather
between a nation (United States) and anyone committing, supporting, or aiding
450. AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 62, at 260.
451. Id. (emphasis added).
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terrorism.452 Therefore it is not a cold war. Second, even if a War on
Terrorism somehow constitutes a cold war, Engblom II’s silent rejection of the
Cold War as a time of war creates precedent that public-policy oriented
conflicts do not constitute a time of war under the Third Amendment. This
follows the meaning of a cold war as a conflict not reaching a full-scale war.
Finally, the War against Iraq is much more than a tense, political conflict. It is
a military conflict between two nations, wherein major combat operations took
place for more than a month. Thousands of people have died.453 A possible
military conflict against North Korea, involving numerous troops and weapons,
would constitute much more than political tension and military rivalry as well.
Englom II’s Cold War silence would not guide us on the status of that potential
conflict.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ANALOGOUS TO THE THIRD AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy parallel the Third
Amendment’s protection against compelled quartering of soldiers in
peacetime. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures454 establishes a strong protection of citizen’s homes from
such searches and broadly interprets the type of government agents prohibited
Thus, Fourth Amendment
from conducting unreasonable searches.455
principles support a vehement protection of the home from government
intrusion in a Third Amendment context and cast a wide net against the type of
persons attempting to be quartered in homes. The right to privacy protects
citizens’ fundamental and personal rights from government intrusion. As the
Third Amendment helped form this protection of privacy in homes from
government intrusion, it should follow that the privacy principles and
guidelines are contained within the broader right to privacy.
A.

Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.456

452. See supra note 149.
453. NPR, War in Iraq: Caualites of Conflict, at http://www.npr.org/news/specials/iraq2003/
pow.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). Seven to nine thousand Iraqi civilians have also died. Id.
454. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
455. See id.
456. Id.
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The Fourth Amendment, contrary to the Third Amendment, triggered a
plethora of interpretive materials. These materials shed light on how
constitutional protections against government intrusion upon such rights,
particularly upon those protected rights within the home, are construed. The
Fourth Amendment’s text and subsequent case law announce a strong
protection of the home from government intrusion. The amendment’s search
and seizure prohibitions are at its zenith when government action occurs within
the home.457 The Fourth Amendment’s protections only apply to searches by
government agents.458 However, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence broadly
defines government agents,459 thereby protecting citizens from an array of
persons conducting unreasonable searches.
1.

The Protection of the Home

“‘[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’”460 “Freedom from intrusion into the
home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the
Fourth Amendment.”461 Therefore, the essence of the Fourth Amendment is
the concept of appreciating the “sanctity of a person’s house.”462 “Without
question, the home is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
protections.”463 Thus, one’s home “has ordinarily [been] afforded the most
stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”464 The home is the clearest example
of an area where citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy.465
Consequently, “one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in [his] home is
entitled to unique sensitivit[ies] from federal courts.”466 One sensibility is that
457. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
458. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968).
459. Id.
460. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States
Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). See also United States v. Daly, 937 F. Supp. 401, 407 (E.D.
Pa. 1996); Walls v. Giuliani, 916 F. Supp. 214, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
461. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 389.
462. State v. Diaz, 607 A.2d 439, 443 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967); State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guertin, 461 A.2d 963
(Conn. 1983)).
463. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (citing Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 151 n.15 (1947); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)).
464. United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S 543, 561 (1976)). See also State v. Riggs, 400 S.E.2d 429, 435 (N.C.
1991) (“[A] private residence is the most highly protected of all places under the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
465. Ayeni v. CBS Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
466. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978). See State v. Platten, 594 P.2d
201, 205 (Kan. 1979) (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543). The Fourth Amendment applies
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
This author believes that the Fourth Amendment applies against the states, as well as the rest of
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a warrantless search inside a home is presumed to be unconstitutional.467 “The
right of police officers to enter into a home . . . represents a serious
governmental intrusion into one’s privacy.”468 It was just that type of
governmental intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed to restrict by
the general requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause before a
search or seizure could take place.469 “When a citizen withdraws into the
sanctuary of the home, a governmental intrusion into that sanctuary . . .
requires a high level of justification.”470
The Third and Fourth Amendment protections against government
intrusion into the sanctity of the home should compliment, not contradict each
other. The Third Amendment protects against compelled quartering of
government soldiers in a home,471 while the Fourth Amendment prevents
unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials in a home.472 The
Fourth Amendment and the Third Amendment are synonymous in this context.
Because the Third Amendment follows a similar principle as the Fourth
Amendment, its interpretation in this respect should follow Fourth Amendment
interpretation. Advancing a Third Amendment methodology in accordance
with the Fourth Amendment fosters legal consistency requiring homes to be
constantly given great protection against government intrusion. To allow the
Fourth Amendment to provide the most stringent protections against
government entry into the home while leaving the Third Amendment as an
open floodgate for compelled quartering of soldiers would create an
inconsistent legal principle in two successive constitutional amendments that
focus on similar rights. This type of topsy-turvy legal paradigm cannot stand.
It would only serve to establish an unbalanced system of constitutional rights
wherein a government soldier could be quartered in a home at the mere sniff of
an armed conflict, while a search and/or seizure of that very home could not
occur absent a warrant, supported by probable cause, and signed by a neutral
the Bill of Rights, through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Schmidt, supra note 24, at 177-78. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Amar, supra note 27, at 123-24; Sanders, supra note
199, at 777; Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application Against
the States, 44 FLA. L. REV. 219, 223 (1992).
467. Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)); see also People v. Hassan, 624 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (concluding that any search or seizure within a home without a warrant is considered
presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
468. Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (Mass. 1975).
469. Id.
470. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); see also Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment’s core is the
right to retreat into one’s own home and be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion).
471. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
472. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

COULD A CIA OR FBI AGENT BE QUARTERED IN YOUR HOUSE

661

magistrate (unless one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement
applied).
This notion also follows Engblom II’s lead when it concluded an apartment
tenant must be considered an owner under the Third Amendment. To hold
otherwise would create a constitutional inconsistency wherein an apartment
tenant would be denied a privacy right against the compelled quartering of
troops, while that same tenant, his guest or even a hotel visitor, would have a
legitimate privacy interest protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures.473 If the home is to be protected, it must be protected in its entirety.
If a person’s house is truly his castle,474 its sanctity cannot be upheld in one
context if it is eradicated in another.
2.

The Broad Meaning of Government Agent

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence also provides guidance on how to
interpret the term soldier in the Third Amendment. Fourth Amendment
protections were “designed to protect the citizenry from abuse of power by the
sovereign.”475 The amendment’s protections have been broadly interpreted to
protect against “unreasonable intrusions on the part of all government
agents.”476 The amendment applies to governmental searches “whether or not
the ‘police’ conduct the search.”477 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment “applies
with equal force to executive, legislative, and judicial action.”478 The
amendment’s applicability has extended to conservation officers,479 fire
inspectors,480 firefighters,481 a uniformed and armed city housing authority
patrolman with authority to enforce penal statutes and regulations,482 railroad
policeman with the power of arrest,483 transit officials,484 public school

473. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II).
474. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1978).
475. United States v. Williams, 527 F. Supp. 859, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment is intended to
protect the sanctity of the home and the privacies of life).
476. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968).
477. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 787 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
478. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see also Swann v. City of
Dallas, 922 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding that Fourth Amendment protection
might extend to health, fire or building inspectors whose purposes may be to locate and abate
suspected public nuisance or to perform routine periodic inspections).
479. Richard v. Indiana, 482 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
480. Schultz v. Alaska, 593 P.2d 640, 642 (Alaska 1979).
481. State of Washington v. Bell, 737 P.2d 254, 257 (Wash. 1987).
482. Dyas v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 522 P.2d 674, 680 (Cal. 1974).
483. United States v. Belcher, 448 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1971).
484. Burka v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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officials,485 informants,486 off-duty police officers acting as security guards,487
off-duty police officers in general,488 airport security personnel,489 and hotel
employees.490
More importantly, the specific person or persons conducting a search or
seizure is not determinative of whether the Fourth Amendment applies.
Instead, the amendment “applies to a search whenever the government
participates in any significant way in [the] total course of conduct.”491
Therefore, the actions of the person or persons involved in the search, as
opposed to the type of person effectuating the action, are paramount. The facts
of each search and seizure are the crucial component of the analysis. Different
persons can be government agents at different times for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Their behavior surrounding the search and seizure shows whether
the search amounted to one performed on or behalf of the government. Thus,
“courts have engaged in a two prong analysis of ‘allegedly’ private
searches, . . . separately analyzing the search aspect apart from the actual
seizure in order to determine whether there was sufficient governmental
participation in either aspect to require [F]ourth [A]mendment protection.”492
The Fourth Amendment’s broad interpretation of government agents
provides protection against searches and seizures that would otherwise violate
the evidentiary and procedural standards set forth in the amendment. Thus, the
core component within the Fourth Amendment is the citizenry’s right to be
free from these government actions. Allowing the government to find

485. In re Doe VIII v. New Mexico, 540 P.2d 827, 831 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 (Mass. 1990) (concluding that school
administrators are government actors and that Fourth Amendment strictures apply to their
conduct); State of Arizona v. Serna, 860 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that
public high school security personnel were state actors).
486. OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
487. United States v. Dansberry, 500 F. Supp. 140, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (concluding “where
private security personnel assert the power of the state to make an arrest or to detain another
person for transfer to custody of the state” the Fourth Amendment is applicable).
488. Smith v. State, 623 So. 2d 382, 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that off-duty
police officer, acting like an on-duty police officer, had to comply with the Fourth Amendment).
489. United States v. Doe, 61 F.3d 107, 109 n.3 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that nongovernment personnel at airport security checkpoints implicates Fourth Amendment protections
because of extensive administrative directives by the Federal Aeronautics Administration);
United States v. Vigil, 989 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a security guard’s
operation of a metal detector at an airport was state action subject to Fourth Amendment
protections).
490. United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a hotel
employee’s warrantless search of room was government action because the police acted as
lookouts for him and his motivation for the search was to gather proof of drug trafficking, rather
than to ensure that hotel property was not damaged).
491. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1973).
492. United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1977).
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somebody else to do its dirty work in order to skirt the Fourth Amendment
essentially eliminates Fourth Amendment protections. Therefore, a broad
interpretation of government agents is required to ensure that the Fourth
Amendment provides full protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Applying this methodology to the Third Amendment means that the
protection against the compelled quartering of soldiers cannot be restricted to a
narrow interpretation, such as a protection against only enlisted soldiers. A
narrow view of soldier would allow the government to violate Third
Amendment protections by simply disguising its compelled quartering activity
under the title of another government employee, while still reaching its desired
result of forcing the compelled quartering of a government agent in one’s
home. The Third Amendment should parallel the Fourth Amendment in order
to create a consistent and ideologically similar framework in two consecutive
constitutional amendments that provide similar protections.
To prevent the government from sidestepping Third Amendment
protections, a narrow view of soldier must be eschewed for an expansive view
of the term. Because the Fourth Amendment applies to all government agents
in order to protect the citizenry from the abuse of the sovereign, the Third
Amendment should follow an analogous analytical scheme. This is not to say
that the Third Amendment applies against any government agent. That would
essentially delete the term soldier in the amendment and replace it with
government agent. Only the people, through their representatives, can alter a
constitutional amendment.493 The Fourth Amendment’s text, which does not
specifically state who cannot institute unreasonable searches and seizures,494
allows for protection against any legislative, executive or judicial agents used
to effectuate unconstitutional searches and seizures.495 Because the Third
Amendment’s text refers to a protection against a soldier, then only a broad
view of soldier can be applied. In this instance, CIA and FBI agents are
Executive Branch employees with military, national security, intelligence or
investigative duties that are sufficiently similar characteristics and powers to
that of traditional soldiers. CIA and FBI agents specifically engaged in
military, national security, and intelligence actions regarding terrorist, Iraqi, or
North Korean foes meet a narrow definition of soldier as they are acting to
defeat or defend against an enemy in a military-oriented confrontation. Those
CIA and FBI agents completing different functions still maintain a power and
responsibility flowing from the Executive Branch (under the supervision of the
President). Those agents, acting to some degree in a law enforcement or
investigative nature, provide the government with information, which, if
493. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
494. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
495. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
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inappropriately used, could lead to it unconstitutionally infringing upon the
citizenry’s rights. This type of governmental abuse, caused through Executive
Branch agents, is exactly the type of abuse the Third Amendment protects
against.
B.

The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy is part of the unenumerated fundamental rights
contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Clause prevents any state from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”496 Even though the Due Process
Clause’s text focuses only on the process by which life, liberty, or property
may be taken, numerous cases interpreted the clause as containing substantive
rights that are generally immune from state regulation.497
The right to privacy took full shape in Griswold v. Connecticut.498
Griswold held a Connecticut statute forbidding the use or assistance in the use
of contraceptive devices violated the right to privacy.499 The Court found that
“[v]arious guarantees [in the Constitution] create[d] zones of privacy,” such as
the right of association in the First Amendment, the right to prohibit the
quartering of soldiers in homes in times of peace in the Third Amendment, the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment, and the right against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment,
and the Ninth Amendment.500 Specifically, Engblom II concluded “[t]he Third
Amendment was designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.”501 If the
Third Amendment was designed to assure privacy and helped to form the right
to privacy, then Third Amendment jurisprudence must advance citizen privacy
against government intrusion. To advance the contrary would limit privacy.
Therefore, a legal jurisprudence broadly protecting the home follows an
encompassing definition of soldier, and the requirement that only a formal

496. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
497. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause prevents the federal government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Despite the clause’s procedural imperative,
it has also been interpreted to have substantive content. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (determining that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause contains an equal protection
component paralleling the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
498. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
499. See id. at 485-86.
500. Id. at 484.
501. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1982) (Engblom II) (citing Griswold, 381
U.S. at 484; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Poe, 367 U.S. at
549 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (concluding
that the penumbras of the Bill of Rights (of which the Third Amendment is a part) helped form a
zone of privacy allowing a woman to terminate a pregnancy)).
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congressional declaration of war triggers wartime status under the Third
Amendment.
A brief review of the Third Amendment shows it strongly favors citizen
privacy over government action. It is rather straightforward. The privacy of
the citizens in their houses is protected from government intrusion absent
wartime situations and subsequent legislative action prescribing the manner in
which that privacy may be infringed.502 However, the Third Amendment’s text
does not codify narrow rules, but instead involves a broader principle.503 The
right not to have the government put its agents in one’s home makes little
sense without some presupposed right not to have the government regiment
every detail of what one does in the home.504 Therefore, the Third
Amendment’s purpose of protecting citizen privacy in their homes from
compelled government quartering of soldiers fosters an indelible privacyoriented right. To effectuate that principle from the Third Amendment’s text
means that a Third Amendment jurisprudence must advance that privacy
principle.505
The historical understanding and structure of the Bill of Rights exemplifies
that the Third Amendment is an integral part of a constitutional scheme
protecting civil liberties and civil rights from government intrusion. The Third
Amendment codifies a constitutional right that certainly invokes individual
privacy protection. Therefore, because the Third Amendment is an integral
protection in an overall web of liberty, it would take quite a lot to pierce it and
remove its place within the Bill of Rights. While this author disagrees with the
Griswold majority’s substantive due process methodology, this author would
still conclude the Third Amendment is a proper source to evaluate if a right to
privacy exists, or if a privacy-oriented unenumerated right exists. Thus, the
Third Amendment is considered an authoritative privacy protection against
government action.

502. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
503. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 71.
504. Id.
505. The Ninth Amendment states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IX. It creates a right of privacy. See Schmidt, supra note 24, at 176; see also Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 491-92 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that the conclusion, that the right of privacy in
marriage does not exist because it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, violates and
gives no meaning to the Ninth Amendment). Instead of evaluating the Third Amendment as part
of the Bill Rights to determine if it helps form a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should evaluate the Third Amendment to help determine if
a unenumerated right to privacy existed under the Ninth Amendment. See Schmidt, supra note
24, at 217-18.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Concluding that a CIA or FBI agent is a soldier and that the United States
is not in wartime until a congressional declaration, complies with the Bill of
Rights’ civil rights protections and its affirmative rebuttal of government
infringement upon such rights. The ordinary meaning of war and its legal
meaning are quite different. The ordinary meaning of the word should be used
to evaluate it in its ordinary construct, such as whether war exists under an
insurance policy. On the other hand, the legal meaning of war, which defines a
wartime state, applies when a legal, constitutional issue of when a time of war
exists under the Third Amendment. This analysis provides a reasonable
interpretation of the Third Amendment because the legal meaning of war in
one constitutional text, the Third Amendment, parallels another legal meaning
of it in another constitutional text, the Declare War Clause. This leads to the
conclusion that a declared war alone alters the United States’ legal status from
peacetime to wartime.
American Presidents showed scrupulous respect for Congress’s authority
to authorize military action for a century after independence.506 Presidents
Jefferson and Adams deferred to Congress to authorize military action in early
American conflicts. In the Twentieth Century, neither President Wilson in
World War I nor President Roosevelt in World War II sent troops to engage in
hostilities on foreign soil until Congress declared war.507 Essentially, “only
since 1950 have Presidents [asserted] . . . authority to commit the armed forces
to full scale and sustained warfare.”508 This presidential assertion, however,
does not constitute a constitutional amendment. Congress still maintains the
power to declare war.509 Only the people, through their representatives, can
amend the Constitution.510 Congress cannot divest itself of its powers and
transfer them to the President.511 A necessary component of separation of
powers is that one branch cannot abdicate its power to another branch.512 Even
powers that are essentially dormant are not lost.513 The history of the legal
meaning of war shows that Congress, not the President, controls when the
nation is in peacetime or wartime. As Congress controls all war-making and
war-authorizing power and the President only commands forces when
Congress authorizes their use, absent defense of a sudden attack or

506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.

Doe Pls.’ Memorandum at 3 (citing ELY, supra note 154, at 147 n.54).
Berger, supra note 160, at 68.
Id. at 67.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
Berger, supra note 160, at 68-69.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 68-69.
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emergency,514 Congress must also authorize when the nation is formally in a
wartime state for Third Amendment purposes.
The Third Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights.515 The Third
Amendment’s protections, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, ensure civil rights
for the citizenry against government action.
Elaborating the Third
Amendment’s textual meaning in light of the Bill of Rights’ surrounding
context, portrays an amendment advancing civil liberty within the home
against government action.516 The Third Amendment is in the midst of
numerous similarly protected liberties within the Bill of Rights.517 These
provisions must be viewed as a shield for the citizenry against oppressive
government conduct. To interpret the Third Amendment in a way in which the
protections it contains are rendered null and void would contradict the Bill of
Rights’ civil rights scheme. Essentially, that view would create a Bill of
Rights minus one. A Third Amendment reading of that kind would place the
amendment out of step with the remainder of the Bill of Rights.
In the end, whether the Third Amendment is viewed as containing
“concrete and specific dispositions”518 or as a foundation for “a periphery
within which a . . . more capacious elaboration of . . . rights and freedoms . . .
would remain possible and . . . likely,”519 it is a constitutional provision with a
meaning that announces a presumption against the compelled government
quartering of soldiers in a citizen’s house. The “[C]onstitution is supposed to
produce workable government, [therefore], . . . [r]esults that are particularly
awkward, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, were probably not
intended.”520 The erosion of an amendment within the Bill of Rights places a
hole in the protective umbrella those amendments create. One hole in the
514. See Bickel, supra note 217, at 132.
515. The first ten amendments of the United States Constitution are commonly referred to as
the Bill of Rights.
516. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 93.
517. The First Amendment protects free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association,
and freedom of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Second Amendment, at least to a degree,
protects the right to bear arms. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable search and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment requires an
indictment or presentment for certain criminal charges, it protects against self-incrimination,
prevents taking private property for public use without just compensation, prevents being twice
subjected to the same offense, and guarantees due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Sixth Amendment grants the right to counsel, the right to jury trials in criminal cases, the right to
a speedy and public trial, and the right of the accused to confront witnesses. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. The Seventh Amendment allows for civil jury trials in disputes for more than twenty dollars.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive bail, excessive
fines, and cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Ninth Amendment
grants individuals rights not enumerated within the first eight amendments. Id. at amend. IX.
518. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 134.
519. See Tribe, supra note 61, at 89.
520. BORK, supra note 25, at 165.
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umbrella destroys the umbrella’s overall protection. Maintaining the Bill of
Rights’ entire protective umbrella, especially in the Third Amendment, is the
only way to ensure we all remain dry in a storm of government rain.

